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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PRICE AND
RENT CONTROL: THE LESSONS OF
UTILITY REGULATION
JOHN N. DROBAK*
Despite the recent trend of economic deregulation, price regulation
continues to be a vital part of the American economic system. Federal,
state and local governments regulate prices for such disparate businesses
as utilities, apartment leasing, nursing homes and insurance. Price regu-
lation was not always so prevalent, however. Prior to Nebbia v. New
York,I the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion had allowed the states to regulate prices only of businesses "affected
with a public interest,"2 or during a temporary emergency.3 In Nebbia,
the Supreme Court eliminated the "affected with a public interest" and
emergency requirements and upheld the authority of the states to regu-
late prices as part of the states' general powers to promote the public
welfare.4 Since Nebbia, price regulation has become an accepted, though
Professor of Law, Washington University. B.S. 1970, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy; J.D. 1973, Stanford University. I wish to thank Gerald P. Johnston, Daniel R. Mandelker, W.
David Slawson and Barry R. Weingast for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I
also appreciate the help of my research assistants, David M. Coffey, Bradley J. Gans, David M.
Souders and Karen A. Winn.
1. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (business of selling gasoline not
"affected with public interest"); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1877) (grain storage
warehouses).
3. See, eg., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135, 155, 157 (1921).
4. The Court wrote:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other consti-
tutional restrictions, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it.
291 U.S. at 537. See also Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245-47 (1941). Most modern courts
interpret the holding in Nebbia to mean that the existence of an emergency is no longer a constitu-
tional prerequisite to price regulation. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1969);
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 153-58, 550 P.2d 1001, 1019-22, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465,
482-86 (1976); Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 555-64, 350 A.2d
1, 7-13 (1975). See generally Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Pro-
cess-The Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Control, 7 THE URB. LAW. 447 (1975). A few
courts and commentators mistakenly continue to explain that certain kinds of price regulation are
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sometimes controversial, part of the government's control over the eco-
nomic marketplace. Given the prevalence of price regulation today, it is
surprising that the constitutional limits on price regulation are not gener-
ally understood.
The Supreme Court has gradually developed the constitutional price
regulation doctrine during the past one hundred years in two distinct
groups of cases. One group has dealt with utility rate regulation; the
other, with federal price controls. Although the two groups of cases ap-
pear to establish inconsistent standards, understanding the consistency
and the kinship between the groups is essential to understanding the con-
stitutional limits on price regulation.
In the first set of cases, the Court interpreted the Constitution as estab-
lishing a lower limit on utility rates. The utility ratemaking cases require
a court to judge the constitutionality of rates by a process that involves
balancing the public and investor interests.5 The great majority of
courts, agencies and commentators understand this constitutional con-
straint to require utility rates high enough to generate moderate profits
for investors.6 In Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,7 the
opinion that established the modern constitutional limits on utility
ratemaking, the Court explained the standard for determining whether
utility rates satisfied the investor interest component of the constitutional
balance:
From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital
costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on
the stock .... By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having cor-
responding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure con-
fidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit
beyond governmental authority unless an emergency justifies the regulation. See, e.g., City of Miami
Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. 1974) (per curiam); City of Miami Beach v.
Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 804-05 (Fla. 1972).
5. See, eg., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1968); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
6. See, eg., Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 742
F.2d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1984); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 730 F.2d 816, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Coun-
cil, 68 N.J. 543, 568-70, 350 A.2d 1, 14-15 (1975); 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 191-93 (1969); Auerbach, The Anatomy of an Unusual Economic Substantive Due
Process Case: Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Association v. State, 68 MINN. L. REv. 545,
650, 652-53 (1984).
7. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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and to attract capital.8
Although the public interest can outweigh the investor interest and jus-
tify rates that are too low to meet the investor interest,9 the investor stan-
dard of Hope plays the predominant role in utility regulation.
In the second group of cases, involving federal price controls, the
Court has not applied standards like those in Hope or required the con-
trolled prices to generate moderate profits for investors. Unlike the
ratemaking cases, this second group of cases does not even require an
examination of the financial effects on the regulated firms and their inves-
tors caused by price control.1 Nonetheless, the dichotomy in the price
regulation doctrine stems from a consistent application of the principles
of the takings clause of the fifth amendment,11 which is the foundation of
both the utility and price control branches of the constitutional doctrine.
The takings clause constrains all types of economic regulation by re-
quiring the payment of "just compensation" if a regulation causes
enough injury to constitute the "taking" of property from the regulated
person or firm. Although there is hearty dispute among academics and
judges over whether compensation is required for many different kinds of
economic regulation, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled over the
past one hundred years that utility ratemaking is a governmental taking
that triggers the compensation requirement.'" The Hope standards as-
sure that adequate compensation for the taking is provided through util-
ity rates. On the other hand, the Court has concluded that the federal
price control programs did not constitute takings. With the compensa-
8. Id. at 603 (citation omitted). For a more comprehensive explanation of the constitutional
limits on utility ratemaking, see generally Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitu-
tional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U.L. REV. 65 (1985).
9. See Drobak, supra note 8, at 88-98, 119-24.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-55.
11. "[Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V, cl. 5.
12. During the initial development of the utility ratemaking doctrine after the Civil War, the
Court analogized railroad rate regulation to eminent domain and concluded that the regulation was
a taking of the use of a railroad's property, which entitled the railroad to just compensation in the
form of reasonable rates. See Drobak, supra note 8, at 75-76, 80-81; Siegel, Understanding the
Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L.
REV. 187, 216-17 (1984). As both the ratemaking doctrine and the jurisprudence of the taking
clause evolved, the Court recognized that the principles of the takings clause that constrain govern-
ment regulation (sometimes referred to as "regulatory takings", San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting), or "partial takings," R. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 57-62 (1985)) are the founda-
tion of the constitutional ratemaking doctrine, rather than the eminent domain principles. See
Drobak, supra note 8, at 82-83, 85.
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tion requirement inapplicable, there is no requirement that price control
schemes satisfy the Hope standards or generate any profits at all. There-
fore, the determination of whether the Hope standards must be satisfied
by a particular regime of price regulation involves a preliminary finding
of whether the regime would otherwise constitute a taking.
The analysis of the preliminary takings issue could involve all the prin-
ciples that the Court examines in regulatory takings cases."l The federal
price control cases demonstrate, however, that three factors play a pre-
dominant role in making the Hope doctrine inapplicable to particular
types of price control: (1) the justification for the price regulation; (2) the
duration of the regulation; and (3) the ability of a firm to withdraw from
the regulated business. The relevance of the first two factors is not sur-
prising because the factors also play important roles in the application of
the takings clause of the fifth amendment as a limit on all types of eco-
nomic regulation.14 The third factor, although occasionally mentioned
in the regulatory takings opinions,"5 is more important in the price regu-
lation cases. The third factor is also the least understood and least appre-
ciated, even though it is a powerful concept for analyzing the
constitutionality of all types of economic regulation.
In examining the constitutionality of price regulation, most courts fo-
13. The takings doctrine involves many different principles that the Supreme Court applies
with different weight in different cases. The doctrine leaves so much uncertainty in its application to
a given problem that it has been criticized for permitting the Court "to reach whatever result it
wants in any particular case." Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause,
1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351, 354-55. Even the Supreme Court acknowledges that it engages in "essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries" to decide takings cases. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). For different perspectives on the unifying principles of the takings
cases, see generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); R. EP-
STEIN, supra note 12; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
The courts' ability to avoid the strictures of the Hope doctrine by concluding that a particular
regulatory program is not an unconstitutional taking raises a special concern. The principles of the
regulatory takings cases leave much discretion to the courts. Because the cases require the balancing
of so many different factors, with differing degrees of importance, a court can often justify any result
in a regulatory takings case by skillful application of the principles. The danger arises from courts
upholding a particular price control program under the takings clause out of a desire to free the
program from the Hope prescripts. The presumption, however, should be the other way. The Hope
doctrine furnishes only moderate protection of investors, at best. Because the choice is between
moderate versus no protection of property rights, the courts should apply the Hope doctrine unless
the regulatory scheme is clearly not a taking.
14. See, e-g., Michelman, supra note 13, at 1196-1201 (justification); Williams, Smith, Siemon,
Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 218 (1984) (tempo-
rary duration).
15. See infra note 89.
[V/ol. 64:107
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/4
PRICE CONTROL
cus only on legal barriers to exit from a regulated business or market.
Utilities cannot cease service without governmental authorization. The
inability to withdraw from the regulated business is one reason for apply-
ing the Hope doctrine to utility ratemaking. A service requirement is not
the only effective barrier to exit, however. This Article discusses two
other kinds of barriers that make the Hope doctrine applicable. First, a
firm's investment in specialized assets, which cannot be easily converted
to other uses, can make exit from a price-controlled business or market
almost as infeasible as a legal service obligation. Second, laws that regu-
late the various means of withdrawing from a regulated business or mar-
ket can also make exit virtually impossible. For example, the legal
restrictions on the demolition of apartment buildings and the conversion
of apartments to condominiums justify most state court decisions that
apply the Hope criteria to judge the constitutionality of rent control.
This Article initially explains the Supreme Court's reliance on the
three factors in upholding the constitutionality of federal price controls
that did not meet the Hope standards. Part II examines the relationship
between the ability to withdraw from a price-controlled business and the
constitutional standards governing the price control. This Part considers
how a firm decides whether to remain in a particular business and how
nonlegal barriers to exit affect that decision. The Part also examines the
barriers that result from investment in specialized assets and analyzes
recent price regulation cases in which courts examined the relevance of
nonlegal barriers to exit. Part II then examines the legal restrictions on
exit from the rent-controlled residential leasing business, including the
restrictions on demolition and condominium conversion, and concludes
that rent control must satisfy the Hope doctrine because the legal restric-
tions comprise an effective barrier to exit. Finally, Part III applies the
constitutional limits on utility ratemaking to determine the constitution-
ality of the typical standards used in rent control. 16
16. Before beginning analysis of the three factors that determine whether the utility ratemaking
constraints must be applied to determine the constitutionality of a particular type of price control, it
is useful to establish the relationship between both groups of the Supreme Court's price regulation
opinions and the modem economic substantive due process cases. As a doctrine, economic substan-
tive due process requires only that the means chosen by a legislature have a rational relationship
with legitimate governmental objectives. See, eg., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S.
117, 124-25 (1978); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. at 531. As applied, the doctrine hardly con-
strains economic regulation at all because the Court rarely reviews the propriety of legislative objec-
tives and defers significantly to the legislature's perception of the means-end relationship. See, eg.,
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450-51 (1978); Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se
Takings: A Decisional Model for the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 490 (1983); Gunther,
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF NATIONWIDE PRICE CONTROL
The cases upholding the constitutionality of nationwide price controls
during World War II and the early 1970s demonstrate the importance of
the three factors-the justification for the regulation, the duration of the
controls and the ability of the regulated firm to avoid the regulation by
withdrawing from the regulated business. The cases also show that the
factors generally arise in combination, just as they do in the regulatory
takings cases, so the relative importance of each factor is sometimes diffi-
cult to discern. In the World War II cases, however, the unique
problems of waging a major war played the predominant role, even
though the Court expressly relied on each factor.
Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to regulate
the wartime economy. 7 The Act empowered the Administrator of the
Office of Price Administration to control the maximum prices of nearly
all goods and services sold throughout the United States, including man-
ufacturing, wholesale and retail prices."8 The Act also authorized the
Administrator to set maximum rents throughout the country.19 Given
the nationwide reach of the controls, the Act did not require the Admin-
istrator to use individual proceedings in fixing prices or rents. Rather the
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1972); McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 38; Oakes,
"Property Rights" In Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REv. 583, 593 (1981); The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 232 (1984). Even if the courts actually examined
the rationality of the means and the legitimacy of the objectives, price regulation would be a defensi-
ble method to achieve valid economic goals in virtually every industry. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City
of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 158, 159-64, 550 P.2d 1001, 1022, 1023-27, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 486, 487-
91 (1976); Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 563-65, 350 A.2d 1, 12-
13 (1975). Thus, government at all levels has the constitutional authority to set prices for all kinds
of goods and services. But just because governments have the authority to set prices, it does not
follow that governments can fix prices as low as they desire. The takings doctrine, sometimes in
conjunction with the Hope doctrine, establishes the lower limit on price regulation.
17. Pub. L. No. 421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942). See generally The Emergency Price ControlAct, 9 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1942).
18. Pub. L. No. 421 §§ 2(a), 302(c), 56 Stat. at 24, 26. See Ginsburg, The Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and Sanctions, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 22, 26 (1942).
19. The Act authorized federal rent control in locales in which defense activities adversely
affected the rental market. Pub. L. No. 421 §§ 2(b), 302(b), 56 Stat. at 25, 35. In the first few
months, the Administrator designated particular areas as subject to federal rent control. See Willis,
A Short History of Rent Control Laws, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 54, 79 (1950). By October 1942, the
Administrator designated the entire United States as subject to rent control under the Act, although
the rents in some, mostly rural, parts of the country were never controlled. See Noel, Federal Rent
Control, 18 TEMP. L.Q. 477, 481 (1944); Willis, supra, at 79.
[Vol. 64:107
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Act provided for maximum industry-wide prices that needed only to be
"6generally fair and equitable." 20 The Act required the Administrator to
roll back prices to those prevailing a few months prior to the Act's enact-
ment.? It also gave the Administrator considerable discretion to adjust
prices depending on such factors as general changes in costs or profits.22
In Bowles v. Willingham,23 a landlord claimed that the standard of
"generally fair and equitable" rents made the Act unconstitutional be-
cause its application could result in rents that were unfair and inequitable
to a particular landlord. 24  According to the landlord, the Constitution
required that each landlord be accorded reasonable rents, just as the
Hope doctrine protected each utility. The Court rejected the landlord's
claim, focusing briefly on the ability of a landlord to avoid the rent con-
trol. Because the Act did not compel the lease of rent-controlled apart-
ments (or the sale of price-regulated goods), 25 the Court concluded
without any analysis that the statute did not unconstitutionally take any
property.26 The option of not leasing apartments or not selling goods
was financially impractical for most landlords and sellers, but the Court
did not consider whether the option was illusory. Instead, the Court pri-
marily rested its holding on the two justifications for the "generally fair
and equitable" standard.
The Court first examined "considerations of feasibility and practical-
ity."27 Nationwide rent control that assured fair rentals for each land-
20. Pub. L. No. 421 § 2(a), (b), 56 Stat. at 24.
21. Most prices were to be rolled back to those prevailing between October 1 and 15, 1941, and
rents to those in effect on April 1, 1941. The Act permitted the Administrator to choose other dates
if desirable. Id. See Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 24, 28-29.
22. Pub. L. No. 421 § 2(a), (b), 56 Stat. at 24-25.
23. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
24 In Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), the Supreme Court upheld the District of Colum-
bia's rent control statute, which specified that each landlord was entitled to reasonable rent. Id. at
157. See Noel, supra note 19, at 494.
25. Pub. L. No. 421 § 4(d), 56 Stat. at 27.
26. 321 U.S. at 517, citing Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348, 351-52 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943); see
Nash v. City ofSanta Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 106, 688 P.2d 894, 901, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 292 (1984);
cf Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 437-38 (1944) (considering absence of compulsion to sell as
a factor supporting constitutionality of procedural aspects of Emergency Price Control Act). Paul
Freund, who argued for the Administrator in Bowles, first expressed this relationship in Freund, The
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942: Constitutional Issues, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 83
(1942).
27. 321 U.S. at 517. To support its conclusion that feasibility was germane to the constitutional
issues, the Court relied on Jacob Ruppert v. Coffey, 251 U.S. 264, 299 (1920) and Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941). The issue in Jacob Ruppert was similar to the problem in
Bowles. In Jacob Ruppert, the Court upheld Prohibition regulations that included beverages with
Number 11
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lord would have required individual proceedings, which the Court
considered "quite impossible."28 The precedents justified group regula-
tion, going back as far as 1877 when the Supreme Court first upheld the
authority of states to regulate prices. 29 The cases also recognized that
although group regulation would cause financial harm to those firms
with higher costs, that disparate result did not make group regulation
unconstitutional. 30 Although the impracticality of individual regulation
was an important justification for the holding in Bowles, the other justifi-
cation, the economic demands of war, overwhelmed the Court's analysis.
War does not stay the operation of the constitutional protections of
individual rights, 31 but it influences greatly the Court's application of the
Constitution. The approval of the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II is the most poignant example of the Court's reli-
ance on the special needs of war.32  The Court's recognition of the exi-
gencies of war in upholding economic regulation, although pedestrian
and less controversial, was equally important to those holdings. When
the government banned the operation of gold mines in the hope that min-
ers from that industry would alleviate the shortage of skilled workers in
the nonferrous metal mines, the Court found no compensable taking be-
cause of the needs of the wartime economy.33 In Bowles, the Court ended
very low alcohol content because an expansive law was thought necessary to make Prohibition effec-
tive. As in Jacob Ruppert, the Court in Bowler tolerated potential unfair treatment of some landlords
as a consequence of the only feasible and effective procedure. Opp was not directly analogous to this
part of Bowler because Opp was a decision that considered impracticality only in the context of
upholding Congress' delegation of authority to an agency.
28. 321 U.S. at 517. The Court cited Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348, 353-54 (Emer. Ct. App.
1943), for this conclusion. Although the court in Wilson reached the same conclusions that the
Supreme Court later reached in Bowler, part of the analysis in Wilson is unpersuasive. The court
rejected the application of the utility regulation cases to rent control because utilities were subject to
other extensive regulation besides rate-setting. The court perceived that the extensive regulation of
utilities justified constitutional limitations based on takings principles. Because rent control did not
entail other extensive regulation, the court found the utility cases inapplicable. Id. at 351-52. Unlike
the Emergency Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in Bowler did not make this distinction be-
tween utility regulation and rent control.
29. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (group regulation of grain elevators). See generally
Kitch & Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 Sup. Cr. REv. 313.
30. See Bowler, 321 U.S. at 518.
31. See, e.g., Bowler, 321 U.S. at 521; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426
(1934); Aidlin, The Constitutionality of the 1942 Price Control Act, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 648, 653
(1942).
32. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944).
33. The Court explained:
In the context of war we have been reluctant to find that degree of regulation which, with-
out saying so, requires compensation to be paid for resulting losses of income .... The
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/4
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its analysis of the substantive challenge to the Emergency Price Control
Act by relying on the paramount wartime justification for price controls:
We need not determine what constitutional limits there are to price-fixing
legislation. Congress was dealing here with conditions created by activities
resulting from a great war effort.... A nation which can demand the lives
of its men and women in the waging of that war is under no constitutional
necessity of providing a system of price control on the domestic front which
will assure each landlord a "fair return" on his property. 4
The economic demands of war also played the primary role in the
Court's approval of the government's requisition practices during World
War II. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.35 is especially im-
portant because the government's requisition destroyed the firm's ability
to withhold its goods from the market. The case involved a dispute over
whether the ceiling price for black pepper imposed under the Emergency
Price Control Act was also the constitutional measure of the just com-
pensation that the government had to pay when requisitioning pepper.
Commodities Trading Corporation, an investor in pepper, began to accu-
mulate pepper with the intention of using the regular cyclical fluctuation
of pepper prices to earn profits.36 After the ceiling price was imposed,
Commodities withheld its pepper from the market, choosing to wait for
higher prices after the end of the war. Pepper became very scarce, so the
government requisitioned about 760,000 pounds from Commodities and
reasons are plain. War, particularly in modem times, demands the strict regulation of
nearly all resources. It makes demands which otherwise would be insufferable. But war-
time economic restrictions, temporary in character, are insignificant when compared to the
widespread uncompensated loss of life and freedom of action which war traditionally
demands.
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). To justify its holding, the
Court emphasized that "the Government did not occupy, use or in any manner take physical posses-
sion of the gold mines or of the equipment connected with them." Id. at 165-66. This conclusion
enabled the court to formally (and artificially) distinguish United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S.
114 (1951), a case in which the Court found a compensable taking when the government took over a
mine in response to a strike threat. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 257 n.71; Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 47 (1964).
34. 321 U.S. at 519 (citation omitted). See Noel, supra note 19, at 479, 496 (war power was
principle justification in Bowles). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 422-23 (1944)
("That Congress has constitutional authority to prescribe commodity prices as a war emergency
measure ... [is] not questioned here .. "). In Yakus, the Court dismissed a procedural rather than
a substantive challenge to the Emergency Price Control Act by relying on (1) the ability of firms to
avoid the requirements of the Act by not selling, (2) the need for practical and expeditious proce-
dures and (3) the special justification of war as reasons for the harsh procedures of the Act.
35. 339 U.S. 121 (1950).
36. Id. at 128, 131.
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offered to pay the ceiling price.3 7 Commodities refused the offer and
chose instead to sue for compensation under the fifth amendment.
The right to withhold goods from the marketplace was unusually valu-
able to a pepper investor because pepper could be stored for years while
the investor waited for the desired market price.38 The requisition de-
stroyed that right. The compensation requirement of the fifth amend-
ment normally requires payment of the fair market value of requisitioned
property, but the controlled economy during World War II was not the
"free, open market" needed to determine that value.39 Commodities re-
jected the government's alternative of using the ceiling price, based on
historical market price, because it failed to include the "retention value"
of pepper.
The majority of the Court relied on the unusual wartime economic
problems and held that the ceiling price was just compensation. The
majority was concerned that its acceptance of retention value would only
benefit those few sellers of nonperishable goods who could and chose to
withhold their goods from sale. Favoring this group "would create dis-
crimination against owners impelled by a sense of duty to sell their goods
to the Government at ceiling prices without waiting for requisition. A
premium would be placed on recalcitrance in time of war."40 The major-
ity perceived that Commodities' loss of anticipated profits was no differ-
ent from the wartime economic losses that countless other firms
suffered.41
37. Id. at 122, 131-32.
38. The right was much less valuable to sellers of perishable products. See United States v.
John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948).
39. See id. at 629-30.
40. 339 U.S. at 127. See also id. at 135-36.
41. The Court compared the economic losses caused by the war:
Under this state of facts the situation of Commodities differed only in degree, if at all,
from that of myriad other commodity owners who quite naturally wished to hold their
goods for higher prices. Postwar inflationary influences are common and generally ex-
pected. Prices cycles, seasonal and otherwise, are also well-recognized economic phenom-
ena. Doubtless owners of steel, textiles, foodstuffs, and other goods could produce
evidence similar to that offered in regard to pepper to show cyclical fluctuations in their
prices. Nor would there be much difficulty in showing that a great many owners had
bought, produced, or manufactured their various merchandise with the idea of withholding
from markets to await expected higher prices. Many lost anticipated profits due to price
control or requisition. Sacrifices of this kind and others far greater are the lot of a people
engaged in war. That a war calls for sacrifices is of course no reason why an unfair and
disproportionate burden should be borne by Commodities. But the facts here show no
such burden on Commodities. Commodities, just like other traders in pepper and other
products, bought pepper with the intention of ultimately selling on the market. No more
than any other owner is Commodities entitled to "retention value," a value based on specu-
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Although the economic demands of war were the most important jus-
tification for the constitutionality of the World War II controls, the cases
upholding price controls during the early 1970s demonstrate that a mas-
sive war effort is not a prerequisite to price controls that fail to satisfy the
constitutional ratemaking doctrine. In 1971, President Nixon imposed a
ninety-day freeze on nearly all prices, rents and wages, acting under the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.42 General controls on prices, rents,
wages and profits followed the freeze and remained in effect in different
versions until the Act expired in 1974.43 The United States was still
fighting in Vietnam when Congress authorized and the President enacted
the freeze and the controls, but the war effort was not the justification for
the regulation. Rather, the economic program was an attempt to control
inflation and to stimulate the unproductive segments of the economy.'
The Supreme Court did not hear any takings or substantive due pro-
cess challenges to these controls.45 In Western States Meat Packers Asso-
ciation v. Dunlop,4 6 the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals rejected
lation concerning the price it might have obtained for pepper after the war and after price
controls were removed.
Id. at 129. The Supreme Court also rejected the use of retention value because any proof of future
economic conditions and prices would have been too speculative for a court to use in determining
retention value. See id. at 126-27, 135.
42. Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 796, 799-800 (1970). See R. KAGAN, REGULA-
TORY JUSTICE 25 (1978); Carr, Heinke & Ryan, Short Historical Perspective of Economic Controls in
the United States, 33 Bus. LAW. 3, 19 (1977), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL PRICE AND WAGE CONTROL
PROGRAMS 1917-1979: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 2,
18-19 (B. Reams ed. 1980).
43. See R. Kagan, supra note 42, at 57 n.31; W.D. SLAWSON, THE NEW INFLATION 310-13,
315-17 (1981); Carr, Heinke & Ryan, supra note 42, at 18-25. See generally R. LANZILOTTI, M.
HAMILTON & B. ROBERTS, PHASE II IN REVIEW: THE PRICE COMMISSION EXPERIENCE (1975).
44. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 1330, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 9-11 (1970), reprinted in 59 FEDERAL PRICE AND WAGE CONTROL PROGRAMS 1917-1979:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, Doe. No. 270 (B. Reams ed.
1980); cf. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743, 744
(1971) (continuing and amending the 1970 Act "in order to stabilize the economy, reduce inflation,
minimize unemployment, improve the Nation's competitive position in world trade, and protect the
purchasing power of the dollar"). But cf Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doc-
trine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 105 n.267 (1983) (pointing out that one could argue that the 1971 controls
were actually justified by the Vietnam War).
45. This was also the case for the price controls in effect during the Korean War. The Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of those controls on the basis of the war power. See United
States v. Excel Packing Co., 210 F.2d 596, 597-98 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954). In
the only case concerning the Korean War controls that reached the Supreme Court, the constitu-
tional issues were premature because the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies. See
Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 553 (1954).
46. 482 F.2d 1401 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1973).
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a takings claim on the basis of Bowles.47 The court did not consider
whether Bowles was an inappropriate precedent because it involved war-
time controls; nor did it investigate the difference between the need for
controls during World War II and during the early 1970s. Although the
justification for the World War II controls was much greater, the court's
reliance on Bowles was proper. The serious economic problems of the
early 1970s were a justification for requiring the firms to bear a share of
the economic distress.48 Even if the economic justification alone were
not sufficient to permit a departure from the Hope requirements, the tem-
porary duration of the controls easily satisfied the takings clause.
The temporary duration of the government's interference with prop-
erty rights is a factor that the Supreme Court has relied upon to reject
takings challenges to many different kinds of regulation.49 In Block v.
Hirsh,5° the Court upheld rent control in the District of Columbia during
World War I in part because the regulation was a temporary measure. 5'
Even though that opinion preceded the change in the economic substan-
tive due process doctrine, the Court's reliance on the temporary duration
of the rent control is still a vital principle.52 Consequently, the tempora-
47. Id. at 1403-04. Accord Local 11, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Boldt, 481 F.2d 1392, 1395
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.) (rejecting claim that wage limitation affected a compensable taking), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973); Minden Beef Co. v. Cost of Living Council, 362 F. Supp. 298, 307-08
(D. Nev. 1973).
48. See W.D. SLAWSON, supra note 43, at 319 (1981). In upholding the power of Congress to
enact The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 under the commerce clause and the application of the
Act to state employees, the Supreme Court explained that Congress enacted the Act "as an emer-
gency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national economy." Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975). See also Belknap, supra note 44, at 104-07 (arguing that the distin-
guishing of Fry by the majority in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1976),
resurrected the peacetime "emergency power doctrine" that justifies legislation that would be uncon-
stitutional if there were no emergency).
49. See, eg., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428, 335 n.12,
440, 450-51 (1982); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980); W.
STOEBUCK, NONTRspAssoRy TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 198 n.122 (1977); Michelman, supra
note 13, at 1228-29 n.1l0; Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, supra note 14, at 218.
But cf San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657-58 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that the temporary duration of regulation is unimportant to the determination of
whether compensation is required).
50. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
51. As Justice Holmes explained, "A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may
justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." Id. at 157. See also Wilson v.
Brown, 137 F.2d 348, 352 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943) (relying on this part of Block v. Hirsh in upholding
the World War II controls).
52. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440, 450-51
(1982) (relying on Block v. Hirsh for the relevance of the duration of regulation); Fresh Pond Shop-
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riness of price control is an important factor that can make the constitu-
tional utility ratemaking principles of Hope inapplicable.53 Congress
intended the Nixon-era price freeze and controls to be temporary, and
they were." Strangely, the court in Dunlop upheld the Nixon-era con-
trols without relying on the temporary duration of the controls. Instead,
the court rejected the takings claim simply by relying on the ability of the
regulated firms to withdraw from the price-controlled business. 5
II. THE ABILITY TO WITHDRAW FROM A PRICE-CONTROLLED
BusINEss
A. The Supreme Court's Reliance on the Freedom to Withdraw
The Supreme Court's recognition of the relevance of a firm's ability to
withdraw from a regulated business is as old as the constitutionality of
the states' authority to fix prices. In Munn v. Illinois,56 the Court used
formal nineteenth-century legal analysis to uphold the states' authority
to set the prices of those businesses "affected with a public interest." The
Court explained that a business owner implicitly grants to the public a
property interest when the owner uses the property in a manner that
ping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 878 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from dismissal of
appeal) (same).
53. See Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 878 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal) (concluding that the absence of a "foreseeable end to the emer-
gency takes this case outside the Court's holding in Block v. Hirsh"). New York has continuously
justified rent control since World War II on the basis of a housing emergency, and the New York
Court of Appeals has repeatedly relied on the existence of a temporary emergency in fashioning the
constitutional standards that it uses to review rent control statutes. See Baar & Keating, supra note
4, at 481-85. The permanency of the housing problems and the rent control authorizations in New
York preclude using temporariness as a reason for not applying the Hope standards.
54. The first authorization for the controls was to be effective for only about six months. See
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-380, § 206, 84 Stat. 796, 800 (1970). Amendments
extended the authorization for about three and one-half years. See Economic Stabilization Act
Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, § 8, 87 Stat. 27, 29 (1973); Economic Stabilization Act
Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 218, 85 Stat. 743, 752 (1971). The President began the
freeze about nine months after Congress gave him the authorization to act. See Exec. Order No.
11615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971), reprinted in 63 FEDERAL PRICE AND WAGE CONTROL PROGRAMS
1917-1979: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, Doe. No. 292
(B. Reams ed. 1980). Although the regulatory program officially ended on April 30, 1974, the
program practically ended with the end of the Phase II controls in early 1973, because enforcement
was curtailed and the Phase 3 controls were generally self-administered. See W.D. SLAWSON, supra
note 43, at 311, 331; Carr, Heinke & Ryan, supra note 42, at 24.
55. 482 F.2d at 1403-04.
56, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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affects the general public." The public's property interest allows govern-
mental control of the property, including price regulation. To demon-
strate the fairness of the regulation, the Court noted that the business
owner "may withdraw his grant [of the public interest] by discontinuing
the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the con-
trol.""8 The grain elevator owner in Munn was not legally obligated to
remain in the grain storage business, but the Court failed to consider
whether exit from the business was actually a feasible option. Within a
short time, the ability to exit became unimportant to the justification for
the states' authority to regulate, because the Court firmly established the
authority to regulate all businesses affected with a public interest, even
those from which firms could not legally withdraw. 9
Legal barriers to exit from a regulated business are a major reason for
the constitutional ratemaking doctrine.60 The statutes require utilities to
continue providing service until they obtain permission to cease.61 The
obligation to provide service is so important that utilities may be forced
to incur continuing operating losses while proceeding through reorgani-
zation procedures.62 The Court's perception of this service requirement
as analogous first to eminent domain and then to regulatory takings, led
to the development of the modern constitutional limits on utility
ratemaking. 63 Currently, the inability of utilities to withdraw from their
57. Cf Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941) (relying on Justice Holmes' dissent in
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927), which labeled the implied grant of a public
interest "little more than a fiction").
58. 94 U.S. at 126.
59. See, eg., Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 580, 585-
86 (1896); Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 308, 331 (1886); Jones, Origins of the Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426,
426-27, 506 (1979).
60. See, eg., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 157; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S.
362, 409 (1894).
61. See, eg., California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978); Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 352 (1951) (concurrence); Northwestern Pac. R.R. v.
United States, 228 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal.), affid sub nom. McCulloch v. Ca. Franchise Tax Bd.,
379 U.S. 132 (1964); Jones, supra note 59, at 426-27, 506.
62. See, eg., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 122-25 (1974); Rogers,
The Impairment of Secured Creditors'Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between
the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 1010-12 (1983).
63. See Drobak, supra note 8, at 70-81. In a circuit court opinion that influenced greatly the
development of the constitutional ratemaking doctrine, Justice Brewer emphasized the importance
of the permanency of the utility business:
[W]hen the strong arm of the legislation is laid upon property invested in railroad transpor-
tation, it must be so laid as to do justice to such investors. There can be no justice in that
which works to such investors a practical destruction of their property thus invested. It
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businesses continues to influence regulatory decisions."
The ability to exit from the regulated business or market is important
to group regulation of firms that would otherwise have their prices set in
individual proceedings under the constitutional constraints of Hope. The
best example of this arose when the Federal Power Commission lacked
the resources to regulate the prices of natural gas producers with the
kind of individual proceedings that it used to regulate interstate pipe-
lines. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,65 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Commission's newly devised procedure of us-
ing average cost data to set the same rates for all the producers in a
defined geographic producing region. Relying on a series of cases involv-
ing railroad and truck rates, the Court in Permian Basin explained that
group rates had been upheld "if the agency [had] before it representative
evidence, ample in quantity to measure with appropriate precision the
financial and other requirements of the pertinent parties."66 Notwith-
standing the long history of group rates, the gas producers claimed that
group price regulation violated the Constitution unless the members of
the regulated class were "proffered opportunities either to withdraw from
the regulated activity or to seek special relief from the group rates."67
The Court in Permian Basin expressly avoided determining whether this
was a constitutional imperative in every situation, and concluded that the
Commission had provided satisfactory individualized special treatment.6
If a producer's out-of-pocket expenses for a particular gas well exceeded
must always be borne in mind that property put into railroad transportation is put there
permanently. It cannot be withdrawn at the pleasure of the investors. Railroads are not
like stages or steamboats, which, if furnishing no profit at one place, and under one pre-
scribed rate of transportation, can be taken elsewhere, and put to use at other places, and
under other circumstances. The railroad must stay, and, as a permanent investment, its
value to its owners may not be destroyed.
Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 64 F. 165, 176-177 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894), affd sub nom. Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898). See Bernstein, Utility Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive That Couldn't, 1970
WASH. U. L.Q. 223, 237.
64. See, e.g., In re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. U. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 453-55 (Mass. Dep't
Pub. Util. 1982), aJfd sub nom. Attorney General v. Dep't Pub. Util., 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d
414 (1983).
65. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
66. Id. at 769.
67. Id. at 770.
68. Id. Although the Court avoided this issue, the Court, citing only Bowles, acknowledged that
some of its prior decisions suggested that the Constitution required that kind of individualized treat-
ment. Id. Railroad group rates had included procedures for individual relief. See, eg., Chicago &
NW. Ry. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 326, 342 (1966); New England Div. Case, 261 U.S.
184, 197-99 (1922).
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
122 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
its revenue from the well under the area price, the Commission agreed
either to permit abandonment of the well as a supply of interstate gas,
which the Commission implied would be the preferred remedy, or to
grant an exception to the area price.69 Abandonment was a prerequisite
to conversion of the gas to intrastate sales.70 Thus, the special procedure
for abandonment gave the producers an opportunity to withdraw their
financially unproductive wells from the federally regulated interstate
business. In the natural gas pricing cases decided since Permian Basin,
the Court has reaffirmed the necessity for special, individual relief from
group rates.71
Accepting the premise of the price-control cases that sellers have a
true option of withholding their goods from sale,72 the individual relief to
natural gas producers gives them similar options as the sellers of price-
controlled goods. Thus, under this view, individual relief is essential to
reconciling natural gas producer regulation with nationwide price con-
trol. Even if the premise of the price-control cases is incorrect, and many
sellers cannot stop their sales without inordinate financial harm to their
businesses, individual relief from group rates is desirable whenever it is
feasible without harming important governmental objectives. The
unique problems of the wartime economy and the impracticality of oper-
ating a nationwide pricing program applicable to nearly all goods and
services justified the absence of individual relief in the federal price con-
trol programs. 73 Further, the limited duration of the Nixon-era controls
69. 390 U.S. at 770-71. The FPC had only sketched an outline of this special relief, leaving
most of the details to be worked out when producers sought special treatment. The court of appeals
found this outline inadequate and vague, but the Supreme Court was satisfied given the novelty and
experimental nature of the group rates. The Court concluded that the "Commission quite reason-
ably believed that the terms of any exceptional relief should be developed as its experience with area
regulation lengthens." Id. at 772.
70. See generally California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978) (prohibiting aban-
donment even after mineral lease expired).
71. See FERC v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 439 U.S. 508 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417
U.S. 283, 328 (1974). The high-cost producers in Permian Basin also claimed that the group rates
were unconstitutional because they were disproportionately harmed. In dismissing that claim, the
Supreme Court relied on the rejection of a similar claim in Bowles v. Willingham, 390 U.S. at 768-69
(citing Bowles, 321 U.S. at 518). See supra text accompanying note 31. Permian Basin shared an-
other similarity with Bowles. An important justification for group regulation in both cases was the
infeasibility of individual price setting procedures. Compare Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 757-58, 771-
72, 777, with Bowles, 321 U.S. at 517, 519.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26 & 55.
73. Even though the size of the group expanded from the natural gas producers in a geographic
basin to all the producers in the country, see, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.,
463 U.S. 319, 330-31 (1983), it is more difficult to carry out a procedure affording special, individual.
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minimized the consequent financial harm.
B. Barriers to Exit Resulting from Specialized Assets
The utility and price control cases illustrate that any firm legally com-
pelled to sell at a controlled price, even a firm that cannot be classified as
a utility, is entitled to the protection of the Hope doctrine unless a strong
justification, such as wartime economic needs or the limited duration of
the regulation, justifies a departure from that constitutional protection.74
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the absence of a legal com-
pulsion to continue in business should make the Hope doctrine inapplica-
ble. If a firm is both legally and practically able to withdraw from a
price-controlled business, the firm does not need the protection of the
Hope doctrine; the firm can protect itself.75  If a firm is under no legal
compulsion to remain in business, but its investments are such that it
cannot afford to withdraw from the price-controlled business without in-
ordinate financial loss, it is a fiction to justify the lack of constitutional
protection on the basis of the ability to withdraw.76 Before a court can
fairly rely on withdrawal as a reason for not applying the constitutional
ized relief for all the firms subject to nationwide price controls. With feasibility an important consid-
eration of the court in both Bowles and Permian Basin, see supra note 71, the greater difficulty of
individualized relief in nationwide price control adds to the justification for the difference between
Bowles and Permian Basin.
Special relief from nationwide price controls may sometimes be ineffective. Phase II of the con-
trols in the early 1970s based the controlled prices on the prices in effect during the price freeze plus
cost increases. See R. LANZILLOTTI, M. HAMILTON & B. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 34-35, 66-70.
To prevent a firm from selling at a loss, the Phase II controls contained an exception that allowed a
firm to charge whatever price it needed to cover its costs. When the price freeze went into effect,
most firms in the shoe industry were selling below cost in order to compete with foreign manufactur-
ers. Although these firms were entitled to raise their prices to cover their costs, they could not raise
them because the lower prices of the other firms kept the market prices down. Consequently, these
firms had to operate at a loss during Phase II. Letter from W. David Slawson, General Counsel to
the Price Commission during Phase II (Sept. 27, 1984). This would have been the case even without
the price controls, unless the low-cost competitors raised their prices to achieve above normal prof-
its. The controls prevented the competitors from raising their prices except as needed to cover in-
creased costs. For a discussion of other problems under Phase II involving loss and low-profit firms,
see R. LANZILLOTrI, M. HAMILTON AND B. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 75-77.
74. See Mora v. Mejias, 223 F.2d 814, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1955) (concluding that rice importers
required to sell at a loss were entitled to the same constitutional protection as utilities).
75. See Alabama Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 353 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law-Are Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L. REV.
707, 730 (1981).
76. Notwithstanding the infeasibility of withdrawal from the price-controlled business, the
Hope doctrine need not be satisfied if the economic needs of war justify the controls or if the controls
are only temporary.
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utility ratemaking limitations, the regulated firm should have an oppor-
tunity to prove that withdrawal is not feasible without inordinate finan-
cial loss. If price regulation produces losses great enough to trigger the
takings clause, the court can satisfy the compensation requirement by
awarding damages or by requiring the controlled prices to meet the re-
quirements of the constitutional utility ratemaking doctrine.7
It can be expensive for a firm to withdraw from the business of produc-
ing and selling a particular product or to change its entire business. Ac-
cording to basic microeconomic principles, a profit-maximizing firm will
cease production when its total revenues do not at least equal its total
operating costs. 7 8 A firm always has the option of not producing at all;
then it would have a loss equal to its fixed costs. As long as production
adds more to revenue than it adds to cost, production will generate some
revenues to pay part of the firm's fixed costs. Thus, the firm's loss will be
less if it produces, so the profit-maximizing firm will continue production
if its only other option is to close its business. 79 With price controls, the
government can decrease the prices that the firm charges so that the
firm's revenues barely exceed its operating costs and provide only a small
amount toward fixed costs. The firm will forego returns to common
shareholders and pay most of its interest and preferred dividends out of
something other than its revenues.8 0 Although this could create a large
financial loss, the firm will remain in the price-controlled business even
though it is not legally compelled to do so, unless the firm can find an-
77. See Troy, Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 300 (3rd Cir. 1984). Some financial loss is tolerable
because the takings clause permits regulation to decrease value substantially before the compensation
requirement is triggered. See, eg., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131
(1978); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944). The greater the
need for the regulation, like the economic needs of war, the greater the diminution in value tolerable
under the takings clause. See, eg., Costonis, supra note 16, at 468, 499-501. See generally Drobak,
supra note 8, at 101-03. The use of the Hope doctrine to assure just compensation for the takings
aspect of price regulation is analogous to the "amortization" of an existing property use that fails to
conform to zoning requirements. See generally D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 135-37 (1982).
Both regulated rates and amortization of an existing use ameliorate the financial harm caused by
government regulation; without them, the regulation would be unconstitutional.
78. See, eg., R. Lipsey & A Steiner, Economics 274 (2d ed. 1969). The term "operating costs"
in the text is used to mean variable costs.
79. See id. The special relief in Permian Basin was consistent with this economic theory. The
relief was available for those gas wells that an unregulated firm would shut down or sell, i.e., those
wells with operating revenues less than operating costs. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
80. The firm would have to find a source of cash to pay interest and preferred dividends, such
as retained earnings or a depreciation fund.
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other unregulated market for its products or convert its facilities to pro-
duce other products that will generate greater returns.
Many firms will withdraw from a price-controlled business even if the
controlled prices result in a sizeable contribution to fixed costs. A firm
will reassess the expected returns from its price-controlled products,
compare those returns with expected returns from selling its products in
other unregulated markets and from selling other products, and deter-
mine the costs of producing the alternative products.81 If the firm can
feasibly sell its current products in a different market that is not price-
controlled and earn greater returns in that market, the firm will with-
draw from the price-controlled market. Similarly, if alternative products
will generate greater returns and it is not too costly to convert to produc-
tion of the alternative products, the firm will switch from production of
the price-controlled product.82
For example, if a town sets a low price for wholewheat bread sold by
bakers in an attempt to encourage a switch from plain white bread, the
bakers can avoid the price control by producing other kinds of breads
with the facilities used to make wholewheat bread. If the town controls
the prices of all breads, the bakers can switch to other baked goods that
can be made with the same facilities used to make bread. If the town
controls the prices of all baked goods and the bakers cannot feasibly sell
their products elsewhere, the bakers still retain the option of selling their
facilities and investing the sale proceeds in another business. Given the
nature of the bakery business, only the last alternative of closing the
bakery business is likely to impose considerable financial losses on the
bakers. This, however, would be otherwise for businesses that involve
large specialized investments.
A firm that invests in specialized assets, which are considerably less
valuable when used for anything other than their intended purposes,
opens itself up to opportunistic behavior. If a party to a contract invests
in specialized assets in order to fulfill the contract, the other party will be
in a position to negotiate for more than the contract provides because the
specialized assets lock the first party into the contractual relationship.83
81. The firm will also consider the anticipated duration of the price controls and the likelihood
of expansion of the controls to other products.
82. See generally H. LEVY & M. SARNAT, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS
12-114 (1978). Cf Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and
Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 530-31 (1984) (discussing the methodology for deciding
whether to invest in new facilities).
83. See, ag., 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IM-
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This opportunistic behavior is possible because the party making the in-
vestment cannot use the assets for another purpose without a significant
decrease in the revenues produced by the assets.84 Once the specialized
assets are acquired, the other party to the contract can bargain to pay
slightly more than the revenues that the assets would produce in their
next best use and still be the most financially attractive alternative avail-
able to the investing party. 5
This theory of opportunistic behavior provides an important justifica-
tion for utility regulation. 6 A utility plant, like the generating stations
and distribution network of an electric utility, has few alternative uses.
Once the plant is built, the utility is subject to its customers' opportunis-
tic behavior. Some aspects of utility regulation encourage the construc-
PLICATIONS 26-37 (1975); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089,
1100-02 (1981); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Com-
petitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240 (1979).
84. Armen Alchian has illustrated this phenomenon with the example of a printing press owner
who prints a daily paper for a newspaper company for $1,000 a day, the value of the printing service
to the company. If the next best alternative user of the press would pay only $600 a day for the
printing services, the newspaper company would have an incentive to bargain down its payments to
the press owner to slightly more than $600 a day. See Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropriable
Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 Sup. Cr.
ECON. REV. 235, 239 (1982). See also Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 83, at 298-99 (similar
example). In Alchian's model, a "quasi-rent is any return to a resource above that necessary for its
temporary existence." Alchian, supra, at 239. If it costs only $100 a day to continue the press's
operations once the press is built, the quasi-rent is $900 ($1,000 payment from the newspaper minus
$100). The "value to a specific user in excess of its value to all other users is the specific quasi-rent."
Id. (emphasis in original). In the example, the specific quasi-rent is $400, calculated from ($1,000-
$100) minus ($600-$100). Since the $400 may be expropriated by the newspaper company, the $400
is an "expropriable specific quasi-rent." Id.
85. This kind of opportunistic behavior does not invariably entail renegotiation or breach of the
contract, because long-term contracts often lack sufficient detail and provision for unanticipated
contingencies and because performance cannot always be measured objectively. Alchian, supra note
84, at 239. For example, after General Motors agreed in 1919 to buy substantially all its metal auto
bodies from Fisher Body for the next ten years, General Motors was open to opportunistic behavior
because it could no longer threaten to take its business elsewhere. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian,
supra note 83, at 308-09. Taking advantage of the growing demand for both automobiles and metal
auto bodies and the ambiguities in the contract's definition of the price that General Motors was to
pay Fisher, Fisher Body charged prices that General Motors believed to be too high. General Mo.
tors' dissatisfaction with its contractual arrangement with Fisher Body culminated in the auto
maker's vertical integration by purchasing Fisher. See id. at 309-10.
86. See Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. EON. 426, 434-35 (1976).
The most common rationale for utility rate regulation is the economic theory of natural monopoly.
See, e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-19 (1982); T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGU-
LATION OF BUSINESS 18-20 (1976). For a criticism of the natural monopoly justification, see Dem-
setz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
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tion of utility plants and minimize the risks of this opportunistic
behavior, such as exclusive franchises, restrictions on entry, protection
from competing technologies and assurances of adequate prices.8 7 Con-
versely, customers depending upon one firm for a particular utility ser-
vice are subject to the firm's opportunistic behavior. Thus utility
regulation protects the customers' right to be served at a regulated price
and quality.88
The theory of opportunistic behavior also helps the understanding of
other types of price regulation. Firms with investments in specialized
assets are less able to withdraw from a price-controlled business. As a
result, a government can set lower prices for these firms with a greater
likelihood that the firms will continue to sell their products at the regu-
lated prices. The specialized assets allow the government to act oppor-
tunistically, just as they do for a contracting party. 89 Unlike a party to a
contract who acquires assets to perform the contract or a utility that
invests in specialized assets to carry out its legal service obligations, a
price-controlled firm with specialized assets did not acquire the assets to
87. See Goldberg, supra note 86, at 426-27, 432-36; Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural
Monopolies-In General and With Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 73-75, 103 (1976).
88. See Goldberg, supra note 86, at 439-41; cf. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 83, at
310-11 (discussing the ability of an oil pipeline owner to appropriate quasi-rents from both oil produ-
cers and refiners).
89. To use Alchian's terminology, see supra note 84, the government can expropriate the spe-
cific quasi-rent from the regulated firm for the benefit of the firm's customers. This relationship
between the effectiveness of regulation and specialized investment extends to all types of economic
regulation, not just price control. For example, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984),
a manufacturer of pesticides claimed that the federal laws regulating the use of pesticides unconstitu-
tionally took the manufacturer's property by allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to dis-
close publicly trade secrets filed with the EPA as part of the registration of a new pesticide and by
permitting the agency to use the trade secrets filed by one manufacturer in support of the registration
of a competitor's pesticide. In rejecting the takings claim, the Court explained that Monsanto chose
to file the trade secrets with the EPA in order to register its pesticides, knowing that the statutes
permitted disclosure and use of the secrets. Id. at 2875. Although federal law requires pesticides to
be registered before they can be sold in the United States, the Court said that Monsanto could avoid
the risk of public disclosure of its trade secrets by not registering new pesticides for sale in the United
States but selling them only in foreign markets. IM. at 2875-76 & n. 11. Although some of the plant
and processes used in pesticide manufacture probably could be used for other chemical products,
Monsanto surely has considerable investments in pesticide development and manufacture that would
be worth much less if used for other products. It would be very costly for Monsanto to give up its
United States market for pesticides. Consequently, the "voluntary submission of data by an appli-
cant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration," id. at 2876, is not as voluntary as
the Court would have us believe. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 439 n. 17 (1982) (upholding a takings claim even though the plaintiff could avoid the effects of
regulation by ceasing to rent out apartments because "a landlord's ability to rent his property may
not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation").
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fulfill a government obligation. Nonetheless, as long as the regulatory
* takings doctrine protects the price-controlled firm's use of the specialized
assets,90 the firm should also be accorded the protection of the Hope
doctrine.
A few courts have relied recently on the ability to withdraw from a
price-controlled business as a reason for not applying the constitutional
utility ratemaking doctrine. Some courts considered whether withdrawal
was a feasible option; others did not.9" For example, in refusing to stay a
reduction in workers' compensation insurance rates pending a constitu-
tional challenge to the legislation, the Minnesota State District Court in
Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Association v. State92 concluded
that the Hope standards did not apply to insurance companies because
the companies were free not to write insurance policies in Minnesota.93
The court noted the feasibility, as well as the legality, of withdrawing
from business when it contrasted the insurance companies' lack of "ex-
tensive capital investments" with the investments of utilities. 94 Appar-
90. The aspects of the takings doctrine concerning reasonable investment-backed expectations
and vested rights are relevant to this issue. See, eg., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); cf Gentry v. Howard, 365 F. Supp. 567, 573 (W.D. La. 1973) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to an ordinance regulating ambulance rates because the firm entered the
business after the rate regulation went into effect).
91. The Supreme Court touched on the feasibility of withdrawal when it acknowledged in Com-
modities Trading Corp. that sellers of perishable products had less opportunity to avoid the World
War II price controls than sellers of nonperishable goods. See Commodities Trading, 339 U.S, at
127; United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1948) (concurrence); cf Mora v. Mejias, 223
F.2d 814, 817 (1st Cir. 1955) (concluding that it was unrealistic to think that rice importers would
stop importing "the most important staple in the diet of the people"); Klein, Crawford & Alchian,
supra note 83, at 314 (noting that producers of highly perishable crops are subject to opportunistic
behavior by labor unions). The Court in Commodities Trading Corp. did not point out this difference
to give greater protection to sellers of perishable goods; rather it used the difference to justify less
protection for the sellers of nonperishable products. See supra text accompanying notes 39.40.
92. No. 452706 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Sept. 24, 1981), reprinted in Auerbach, supra note 6, at 667-68.
93. Memorandum Denying Stay, Workers' Compensation Insurers Rating Ass'n v. State, No.
452706 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Sept. 24, 1981), reprinted in Auerbach, supra note 6, at 667-68.
94. Id. Unlike the Minnesota District Court, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
flatly declined to rely on the ability to withdraw from the price-controlled business:
The writing of insurance is a lawful business and the Commonwealth may not impose
unconstitutional conditions upon the exercise of the right to engage therein.... While it is
not constitutionally required to fix rates which will guarantee a profit to all insurers, it may
not constitutionally fix rates which are so low that if the insurers engage in business they
may do so only at a loss. The insurers are not required to either submit to confiscatory
rates or go out of business.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 358 Mass. 272, 281, 263 N.E.2d 698, 703
(1970). While the court's decision to protect the economic interests of insurance companies is under-
standable, the court needlessly imposed constitutional requirements on insurance rate regulation. As
long as the firms can truly withdraw from the regulated activity without inordinate financial harm,
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ently the insurers did not attempt to prove that withdrawal was
impractical,95 but the court's conclusion is sensible. Firms writing insur-
ance elsewhere could just terminate their Minnesota business. Firms
writing workers' compensation insurance only in Minnesota might be
able to switch to other kinds of insurance. If they cannot, they should be
able to either close their business or convert to another business without
too great a financial loss, because the business of workers' compensation
insurance does not entail large investments in specialized assets.96
The courts have reached a similar conclusion concerning nursing
home rates. For example, Minnesota regulates nursing home rates by
conditioning the eligibility of nursing homes to receive medical assistance
payments on the nursing homes' agreement to charge all residents, in-
cluding those who do not receive Medicaid payments, only the state-ap-
proved rates for Medicaid recipients.97 In Minnesota Association of
Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Department of Public Welfare,98 the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the constitutional utility
ratemaking doctrine did not apply to this price regulation because the
nursing homes were free either to go out of business or to stop admitting
Medicaid recipients.9 9 The opinions in this and similar cases involving
nursing home rates contain very little data to show whether withdrawal
is an economically feasible alternative. Some nursing homes depend
upon a large percentage of Medicaid recipients to succeed financially.100
the firms are in a position to protect their own financial interests and the protection of the constitu-
tional utility ratemaking doctrine is unnecessary. If a state chooses to use utility principles to assure
fair returns to insurance companies, that should remain a matter of policy for the state, not a consti-
tutional issue for the courts.
95. The insurers' challenge was premised on the claim that the constitutional utility ratemaking
doctrine applied to them regardless of their ability to stop writing insurance in Minnesota. See
Auerbach, supra note 6, at 545, 649-54.
96. If a firm in this kind of case proved that it had no alternatives except remaining in the price-
controlled business or closing down entirely and that closing down would cause it inordinate finan-
cial harm, the court should not rely on the ability to withdraw as a way to avoid the application of
the Hope doctrine.
97. See MINN. STAT. § 256B.48(l)(a) (1984).
98. 742 Fo2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 446. Accord Minnesota Ass'n. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 602 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1979) (denial of preliminary injunction in same case); National
Union of Hosp. Employees v. Carey, 557 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1977); LaCrescent Constant Care
Center, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 222 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Minn. 1974); Sigety v. Ingraham,
29 N.Y.2d 110, 115, 324 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (1971). The court in Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care
Facilities, Ina relied on the discussion in Permian Basin of the pertinence of abandonment of unprof-
itable wells. 742 F.2d at 446. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
100. See National Union of Hosp. Employees v. Carey, 557 F.2d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 1977) (dis-
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It may be impractical for these institutions to avoid price regulation by
declining to accept Medicaid recipients. 101 For these nursing homes, the
question becomes whether they can convert to other businesses without
inordinate financial loss.102 If nursing homes prove that conversion is
too costly, they should receive either compensation for their losses under
price regulation or the protection of the Hope doctrine.
C. Barriers to Exit from the Rental Business
An owner of an apartment building can withdraw from the rental busi-
ness in several different ways. The owner can convert the building to a
condominium or some other use if feasible. The owner can demolish the
building and construct a different kind of building, or the owner can sell
the apartment building. With these options available, a town should be
able to enact a rent control ordinance that does not have to satisfy the
substantive constitutional requirements controlling utility ratemaking.103
Conversion of apartment buildings to condominiums or other uses, how-
ever, undercuts a town's attempt to use rent control to provide an ade-
quate supply of apartments at the controlled prices. 10 4 Consequently, the
regulation, sometimes resulting in the prohibition, of the withdrawal of
rent-controlled apartments from the rental market through controls on
condominium conversion and demolition has become the norm.10 5
senting opinion) (explaining that some nursing homes depend "heavily upon Medicaid reimburse-
ment (as much as 90% in some instances)").
101. IdL
102. That involves examining the alternative uses for their facilities, the salvage value of their
equipment, the cost of demolition of their buildings and the alternative uses of the land.
103. In holding that rent control had to meet the Hope criteria, the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the notion that landlords could withdraw from rent control:
Although in theory the owner of a large apartment building may convert it to other uses or
tear it down and construct something else in its place, in practice such a course is economi-
cally prohibitive, and to force it would be confiscatory. Nor, if the permissible rents are set
significantly below what is just and reasonable, is he likely to be able to find a buyer willing
to pay a reasonable price.
Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 568 n.9, 350 A.2d 1, 14-15 n,9
(1975). Contrary to the court's conclusion, demolition and conversion will be economically feasible
given proper market conditions, as shown by the large number of demolitions of apartment buildings
in Santa Monica in the late 1970s. See Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 100-01, 688
P.2d 894, 896-97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 287-88 (1984); Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control
Law" Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 721, 838-39 (1983).
104. See, eg., Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 858, 868, 679 P.2d 27,
34, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593, 600 (1984); Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 158-59, 418 N.E.2d
335, 338-39 (1981); Baar, supra note 103, at 835.
105. See Berger, supra note 75, at 732-33; Baar, supra note 103, at 836. Rent controls also
include controls on eviction that frequently confer perpetual tenure on tenants who pay the fixed
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1. The Constitutionality of Controls on Conversion and Demolition
Two general types of condominium conversion controls are currently
in use. 106 One type of control permits the conversion but limits the abil-
ity to evict tenants from the apartments that have become condominium
units; the second type regulates the conversion.10 7 Although few pub-
rent and abide by the lease terms and the law. See Baar, supra note 103, at 833-35; Berger, A Public
Utility View of Rental Housing, 50 PA. BAR ASW'N Q. 234, 237 (1979) [hereinafter cited as C. Ber-
ger]; Berger, supra note 75, at 727-28. Many jurisdictions allow evictions if the landlord desires to
occupy an apartment, permanently remove it from the rental market or demolish the building. See
Baar, supra note 103, at 833-34; Berger, supra note 75, at 727-28. Some do not. See infra text
accompanying notes 106-130.
Some commentators have examined the effect on opportunistic behavior in terms of the relation-
ship between landlords and tenants. For example, tenants are prone to landlords' opportunistic
behavior when the tenants have a strong preference not to move because of their emotional attach-
ment to their apartments or neighborhoods or because of the high transaction costs involved in
moving. See C. Berger, supra, at 238. This potential for opportunistic behavior by landlords is one
of the reasons for rent control. See id. at 238-39. On the other hand, increased legal protection of
tenants' rights, such as implied warranties of habitability and anti-eviction laws, make opportunistic
behavior by tenants easier. They also make being a landlord less attractive. Berger, supra note 75, at
734; see Day & Fogel, The Condominium Crisis: A Problem Unresolved, 21 URB. L. ANN. 3, 17
(1981).
106. These controls usually apply to conversions of apartment buildings to cooperatives as well.
See, e.g., Baar, supra note 103, at 835-36.
107. See id. at 836. See generally id at 835-38; Berger, supra note 75, at 734-37; Day & Fogel,
supra note 105, at 44-50. The different kinds of limitations on evictions and condominium conver-
sions vary greatly. New Jersey, for example, stays eviction for three years, and if a developer is
unable to find a comparable replacement apartment for a tenant, the tenant has a right to five addi-
tional one-year stays. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:18-61.2(g), -61.11(a) (West Supp. 1984). See Baar,
supra note 103, at 836-37; Berger, supra note 75, at 735. After the first one-year period expires,
however, the developer can obtain possession by paying the tenant five months' rent. N.J. REv.
STAT. § 2A:18-61.11 (West Supp. 1984). See Baar, supra note 103, at 837; Berger, supra note 75, at
735. In addition to this protection, New Jersey permits tenants who are at least 62 years old or
substantially disabled to remain in a converted condominium unit for up to 40 more years. N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:18-61.22 to -61.31 (West Supp. 1984); see Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287 (3d
Cir. 1984) (upholding the constitutionality of this statute). New York, on the other hand, conditions
the right to convert an apartment building on the agreement by a specified percentage of the tenants
to buy their apartments. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee (McKinney 1984) (applicable to three
counties in the New York City area). See Baar, supra note 103, at 836 & n.435. If only 15% agree,
the developer may convert the building, but cannot evict tenants who do not purchase their apart-
ments. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee 1.(b), 2.(c) (McKinney 1984). If 35% agree, the developer
can evict after waiting three years. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-eee 1.(c), 2.(d) (McKinney 1984).
For a description of a similar conversion option under the New York City ordinances, see Berger,
supra note 75, at 736-37. New York also prohibits the eviction of certain elderly tenants. See N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee 2.(d) (iii) (McKinney 1984); Baar, supra note 103, at 836. See also Day &
Fogel, supra note 105, at 50-53 (discussing other provisions that protect elderly, handicapped and
low- and moderate-income tenants).
Rather than controlling evictions, some towns limit the number of apartments that may be con-
verted to condominiums. For example, Beverly Hills limits conversions to approximately one per-
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lished opinions consider takings challenges to conversion controls,108
four recent cases involving controls in Brookline and Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, illustrate the scope of eviction control laws and the importance
of rent control to the constitutionality of the laws.
Brookline first tried to limit conversions by making eviction certificates
unavailable to condominium developers and by requiring purchasers of
condominium units to wait six months before they could obtain a certifi-
cate permitting eviction of the tenant occupying their unit.10 9 The rent
control board was empowered to grant an additional six-month delay if a
hardship existed. In Grace v. Brookline, 0 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court rejected a takings claim based on the argument that the
law transferred the right of possession from the condominium owner to
the tenant and compelled the owner to become a landlord.'" Two fac-
tors persuaded the court that an unconstitutional taking had not oc-
curred. First, the duration of the law's impact on a unit purchaser was
short, either six months or at most a year.' 1 2 Second, a purchaser would
receive controlled rental income that generated a reasonable return on
investment as compensation for the delay in occupancy.1 3 Because this
income satisfied the constitutional utility ratemaking standards," 4 the
court implicitly relied on the converse of the principle that the price con-
trol cases established: if price regulation results in a reasonable return,
withdrawal from the regulated business may be severely restricted. This
cent of the rental housing stock. Baar, supra note 103, at 836 n.437. San Francisco limits
conversions to 1000 units a year. Berger, supra note 75, at 736. Many ordinances prohibit conver-
sions unless the apartment vacancy rate exceeds some percentage of the total housing stock in the
area, commonly three to five percent. Day & Fogel, supra note 105, at 49; see Berger, supra note 75,
at 736 & n.132.
108. Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting Tenants From Condo-
minium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 179, 209 (1983).
109. See Grace v. Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 46-47, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (1979). Prior to this
law, Brookline routinely permitted developers to evict tenants from rent-controlled buildings that
were being converted to condominiums. Id. at 46, 399 N.E.2d at 1040.
110. Id. at 43, 399 N.E.2d at 1038.
111. Id. at 55, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. The compulsion to become a landlord increased the cost of
purchasing a condominium unit because typical residential mortgages are conditioned upon the bor-
rower's occupying the property as a resident. One of the plaintiffs in Grace lost her mortgage financ-
ing because she could not occupy the unit. Id. at 47, 399 N.E.2d at 1041.
112. Id. at 56-57, 399 N.E.2d at 1046.
113. Id. at 57, 399 N.E.2d at 1046. The supreme judicial court had interpreted Brookline's
requirement of "fair net operating income" for the landlord as requiring a reasonable return on
investment. See Marshall House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd., 358 Mass. 686, 703, 266 N.E.2d 876,
887-88 (1971).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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converse principle has become increasingly important as the restrictions
on exit from the rental business have increased in both number and
scope.
Even before the court issued its opinion in Grace, the town of Brook-
line strengthened its conversion laws. The amended law prohibited the
eviction of a tenant who had occupied a condominium unit continuously
since a time prior to the conversion of the building to a condominium.1 15
Subsequently, condominium purchasers pursued their takings claims in
federal court. In Loeterman v. Town of Brookline,116 the Massachusetts
District Court upheld the constitutionality of the eviction prohibition as
applied to a unit owner who had purchased the unit knowing that the
prohibition had gone into effect." 7 This knowledge led the court to con-
clude that the purchaser's expectation of occupancy was not the kind of
legitimate investment-backed expectation that the takings clause pro-
tected." 8 Like the court in Grace, the district court also relied on the
purchaser's ability to earn a reasonable return under rent control.1 19 The
court recognized that the eviction ban could forever prevent the pur-
chaser's occupancy of the unit, but the purchaser's knowledge of the pro-
hibition and the ability to earn a fair income established the ban's
constitutionality. In a separate case, the same court considered the con-
stitutionality of the eviction prohibition as applied to a purchaser who
bought a unit before the prohibition was enacted. This purchaser ex-
pected to occupy the unit after the delay established by the then-applica-
ble eviction law had expired. In an opinion denying a preliminary
injunction, the court indicated that the ban probably was unconstitu-
115. See Grace, 379 Mass. at 49 n.12, 399 N.E.2d at 1041 n.12.
116. 524 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Mass. 1981), vacated as moot, 709 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.), cerL denied,
456 U.S. 906 (1983).
117. Pending resolution of the appeal from the district court's initial decision, 524 F. Supp. 1325,
the Supreme Court decided Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982),
so the court of appeals remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Loretto. Loeterman v.
Town of Brookline, 709 F.2d 116, 117 (1st Cir. 1983). The district court, in an unpublished opinion,
concluded that Loretto was inapplicable and reaffirmed its original decision. See Loeterman, 709
F.2d at 117; Judson, supra note 108, at 224 n.177. Before the second appeal was resolved, the tenant
vacated the condominium unit voluntarily. Consequently, the court of appeals vacated the judgment
of the district court as moot. Loeterman, 709 F.2d at 119.
118, 524 F. Supp. at 1329. See also Judson, supra note 108, at 224 n.177 (explaining that the
district court reached this samn~conclusion on remand). For an analysis of the court's use of invest-
ment-backed expectations in the takings doctrine, see generally Mandelker, "Investment-Backed Ex-
pectations"-Is There a Taking?" (forthcoming U. CINN. L. REv.).
119. 524 F. Supp. at 1329.
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tional as applied to the purchaser.120 The court never decided that issue,
however, because the case became moot when the tenant voluntarily va-
cated the unit.
1 2 1
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court resolved a similar issue in
Flynn v. City of Cambridge,122 in which it upheld the constitutionality of
a Cambridge ordinance prohibiting the removal of any rent-controlled
unit from the rental market without a permit from the rent control
board. The ordinance gave the board considerable discretion to deny a
removal permit.123 The ordinance did not prevent the conversion of
rent-controlled apartments into condominium units, but it required a
permit before a purchaser could occupy the unit. In a brief analysis, the
court held that the ordinance was not an unconstitutional taking as ap-
plied to owners of condominium units that were purchased and being
used for rental housing before the ordinance went into effect.1 24 The
Flynn court relied on the expectations of the unit owners, but contrary to
the dictum of the federal district court, the Massachusetts court decided
that the ordinance did not frustrate the owners' expectations. Without
explanation, the court concluded that the owners' primary expectation
concerning the use of the property, the expectation that the takings doc-
trine protected, was to use the property for rental housing. Apparently
the court believed that the owners' rental of the units on the effective date
of the ordinance demonstrated that they were primarily landlords, and
120. See Chan v. Town of Brookline, 484 F. Supp. 1283, 1284, 1286 (D. Mass. 1980). Even
though the court thought that it would probably hold the law unconstitutional, the court refused to
enjoin enforcement of the law pending a decision on the merits out of a concern for the harm that
would be imposed on tenants and the rent control board if the status quo were unnecessarily dis-
turbed. See id. at 1286-87.
121. See 524 F. Supp. at 1326.
122. 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981).
123. As Justice Rehnquist explained in another case involving the Cambridge ordinance:
Ordinance 926 delegates virtually unfettered discretion to the Board to determine whether
to grant a removal permit. The Board may consider the benefits of denying removal to the
tenants protected by rent control, the hardship upon existing tenants of the units sought to
be removed, and the effect of removal on the proclaimed housing shortage in Cambridge.
Nowhere does the ordinance suggest that these considerations be balanced against the
landlord's right to put his property to other uses. In short, Ordinance 926 permits denying
a "removal" permit in any situation.
Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 104 S. Ct. 218, 218-19 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing from dismissal of appeal).
124. The court easily disposed of the takings claim of owners who purchased after the ordinance
became effective. Like the condominium owners in Loeterman, these purchasers knew of the ordi-
nance when they bought, so the takings doctrine did not protect their expectations of occupancy.
383 Mass. at 159-60, 418 N.E.2d at 339.
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only secondarily future occupants."' 5 This assumption, however, is un-
realistic in many instances. Some owners surely were deferring occu-
pancy only temporarily, while waiting for a lease to expire or for other
reasons, and their primary intention was to occupy the units.126 Given
the harsh treatment of condominium owners who purchased their units
for occupancy and not investment, the Flynn court should have ex-
plained why it reached its conclusion concerning primary expecta-
tions.' 27 The court may have treated this issue so lightly, however,
because of the importance of the second reason that justified its finding of
no taking. As in the other cases upholding the Massachusetts eviction
controls, the Flynn court relied on the unit owner's ability to earn a rea-
sonable return on investment under rent control.128
125. Soe id. at 160-61, 418 N.E.2d at 340.
126. See Day & Fogel, supra note 105, at 76-77 n.327. But cf Judson, supra note 108, at 228-30
(arguing that the "occupancy interest" of a tenant should be preferred over the occupancy interest of
a condominium unit purchaser in order to protect the greater reliance that the tenant has built up by
living in the community). After the supreme judicial court decided Flynn, the Cambridge City
Council amended the rent control ordinance so that the ban on occupancy would not apply to the
condominium unit owners who purchased their units before the ordinance went into effect. See
Judson, supra note 108, at 229 n.199.
127. The Flynn opinion raises problems concerning the types of expectations of property owners
that the takings clause protects and the relevance of the actual intentions of the regulated party or
class. For example, although the court relied on Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 136 (1978), for the importance of protecting the primary expectation concerning the use of
the property, 383 Mass. at 160, 418 N.E.2d at 339, the court's application of that factor in Flynn is
different from the Supreme Court's use of it in Penn Central. Grand Central Station was built in
1913 to use as a railroad terminal. Penn Central used it that way for years, as it still does. The only
nonrailroad use has been the rental of extra space to a variety of commercial interests. See 438 U.S.
at 115. Given the more than a half century's use of Grand Central Station for railroad purposes, the
Supreme Court concluded that Penn Central's primary expectation was to use the facility as a rail-
road terminal with some office space and concessions. Id. at 136. The court in Flynn did not even
attempt to make the same kind of investigation about primary expectation that the Supreme Court
made in Penn Central. Even if the court had, its conclusion that the owner's primary expectation
was to use the property as rental housing would be even more suspect because the owners of the
condominiums did not have a history of decades of the same use of the property. The resolution of
these problems, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Mandelker, supra note
118.
128. 383 Mass. at 161, 418 N.E.2d at 340. See Day & Fogel, supra note 107, at 76-77 n.327.
Other opinions upholding the constitutionality of ordinances protecting the supply of apartments
also rely on the ability to earn a fair profit under rent control. See, eg., Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727
F.2d 287, 300 (3d Cir. 1984); Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 103, 688 P.2d 894, 898,
207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 289 (1984). Under another interpretation of the takings clause, which has some
limited judicial and academic support, the compensation provided by controlled rents does not sat-
isfy the compensation requirement of the fifth amendment. Justice Rehnquist contends that addi-
tional compensation must be awarded for the loss of the right to exclude others from the owner's
property. See Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 104 S. Ct. 218, 220 (1983) (Rehnquist,
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As part of local rent control procedures, some towns even regulate the
removal of rent-controlled units from the rental market by the demoli-
tion of apartment buildings. For example, before the rent control board
of Santa Monica can issue a removal permit, the board must find that
removal would not adversely affect the housing supply, that the apart-
ments are not occupied or affordable by low or moderate income families
and that the landlord cannot make a fair return on investment from the
apartments. 129 The permit is required if an owner desires to remove the
apartments from the rental market by demolition or conversion. Santa
Monica's demolition regulation resulted in the California Supreme
Court's examination of the importance of the ability to withdraw from
business as part of its constitutional analysis in Nash v. City of Santa
Monica.130
In Nash, a landlord asserted that Santa Monica's requirement of a re-
moval permit violated substantive due process because it prevented him
from evicting his tenants, demolishing the building and holding the unde-
veloped land for resale."' Nash admitted that he could earn a fair return
on investment from the controlled rents and that demolition would ad-
versely affect the supply of housing in Santa Monica.1 32 Consequently,
Nash did not satisfy the prerequisites for obtaining a removal permit. In
his appeal to the California Supreme Court, Nash argued that his case
should not be judged under the rational relationship test normally used
for economic substantive due process claims,1 33 but rather under the
more restrictive strict scrutiny test because the ordinance restrained his
J., dissenting from dismissal for want of a substantial federal question). In at least two cases, courts
held statutes to be unconstitutional takings because they prohibited landlords from recovering pos-
session even though the statutes entitled the landlords to fair rental income. See Kennedy v. City of
Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 384-87, 617 P.2d 713, 718-20 (1980); Rivera v. R. Cobian Chinea & Co.,
181 F.2d 974, 977-78 (1st Cir. 1950). See also R. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 186-88 (arguing that
rent control standards are "simply a euphemism for the confiscation of private property, bit by bit
and year by year").
129. Santa Monica, Cal. City Charter § 1083(t) (1979), quoted in Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v.
Rent Control Bd., 35 Cal. 3d 858, 862 n.2, 679 P.2d 27, 29 n.2, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593, 595-96 n.2
(1984).
130. 37 Cal. 3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1984).
131. The landlord was 17 years old when his mother purchased a $260,000 apartment building
for him. He soon became disenchanted with the rental business. As he put it, "There is only one
thing I want to do, and that is to evict the group of ingrates inhabiting my units, tear down the
building, and hold on to the land until I can sell it at a price which will not mean a ruinous loss on
my investment." Id. at 101, 688 P.2d at 897, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
132. Id. The trial court also found that the building was occupied by tenants of low or moderate
income. Id.
133. See supra note 16.
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"fundamental right" to cease doing business as a landlord. 34 Nash em-
phasized the "liberty" aspect of his right to withdraw from business. He
claimed that the ordinance compelled him to be a landlord against his
will.!35 The court found no compulsion, however, because Nash could
cease being a landlord by selling the property. 136 Because this way to
withdraw from the business was unimpeded, the court concluded that the
"indirect and minimal" burden on Nash's liberty interest did not justify
strict scrutiny. 1
37
The Nash decision is correct. By selling his building, Nash can easily
avoid the problems of being a landlord, so he does not need the protec-
tion of the strict scrutiny test. Although Nash may be dissatisfied and
134. 37 Cal. 3d at 103-04, 688 P.2d at 899, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 290. In both due process and equal
protection analyses, courts use strict scrutiny to protect those fundamental rights that are essential
to our society. See generally Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword On Discovering Fun-
damental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Gunther, supra note 16.
135. See 37 Cal. 3d at 102-03; 688 P.2d at 898; 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
136. See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975) (relying on ability
to sell in denying a takings chalenge to an ordinance that prohibited demolition), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 905 (1976). The court in Nash pointed out that Nash could minimize his involvement by using
a manager to handle all the landlord's duties and by withholding each apartment from the rental
market when it became vacant. See 37 Cal. 3d at 103, 688 P.2d at 898, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
137. Although Nash disclaimed any takings claim, the court nonetheless explained why the tak-
ings clause was satisfied: The ordinance did not interfere with Nash's primary investment-backed
expectations, and it did not preclude him from earning a reasonable return on his investment. In a
similar case, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with this kind of analysis. In dissenting from the Court's
dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question in Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc.
v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983), Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Cambridge ordinance in-
volved in Flynn v. City of Cambridge resulted in an unconstitutional taking when its application
prevented the demolition of a six-unit apartment building. In Fresh Pond, a shopping center bought
the apartment building in order to demolish it and convert the land to a parking lot for one of its
tenants. The tenant had lost part of its parking lot by eminent domain; the shopping center intended
to replace the lost parking area. See 464 U.S. at 875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d at 107-08, 688 P.2d at 901-02, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. Although only
one apartment was occupied when the shopping center applied for the removal permit, the rent
control board denied the permit. After the Massachusetts courts upheld the constitutionality of the
board's decision, Justice Rehnquist supported the Supreme Court's complete review of the case be-
cause he believed that the case raised takings issues that the Court had never decided. He thought
that the ordinance effected a taking, notwithstanding the owner's ability to earn a reasonable return
on investment under rent control. See 464 U.S. at 876-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As Justice
Rehnquist analyzed the case, the shopping center lost the power to exclude others from its property
and to use the land as it chose. The rent control provisions did not require the board to compensate
for the loss of those property rights. Because Justice Rehnquist determined that there was an uncon-
ititutional taking, he implicitly concluded that the controlled rent was insufficient compensation.
Besides Justice Rehnquist's lone dissent in Fresh Pond being contrary to the analysis of the majority
in Nash, it is also contrary to that of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding demolition prohibition), cert denied, 426
U.S. 905 (1976).
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worse off financially without the ability to raze his building, that is part
of the burden of citizenship in society. 138 If Nash remains in business,
the fair return allowed under rent control minimizes his financial harm.
All the cases upholding the constitutionality of the various barriers to
exit from the rental business rely on the right to earn a fair return. 139
2. The Reciprocal Relationship between the Hope Doctrine
and the Constitutionality of the Barriers to Exit
from the Rental Business
The constitutional limits on utility ratemaking and the inability to
withdraw from the rental business have a reciprocal relationship. Selling
an apartment building is a less attractive option when the building is
subject to rent control and to restrictions on demolition and condomin-
ium conversion.14" In their most extreme form, the legal restrictions on
landlords approach the utilities' service obligation because the landlords'
only options are either to continue in the rental business subject to all the
restrictions or to sell at a loss.14 1 Effective legal barriers to exit from the
rental business therefore result in an unconstitutional taking, requiring
just compensation either by damages or by rents that satisfy the constitu-
tional ratemaking principles. The state courts that have considered the
constitutionality of rent control recognize the need for adequate compen-
sation through the application of the Hope doctrine, although they fre-
quently ignore the importance of barriers to exit.' 42 The existence of
barriers to exit from the rental business mandates the application of Hope
138. See, eg., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 410 (1915). See generally Michelman, supra note 13, at 1172-83, 1224-45.
139. Even Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Fresh Pond is consistent with the importance of a fair
return. See supra note 137. He just concludes that the controlled rents are insufficient compensa-
tion. 464 U.S. at 875-78.
140. See, eg., Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 106 n.6, 688 P.2d at 901 n.6, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 292 n.6; Berger,
supra note 75, at 727, 729, 733-34; Judson, supra note 108, at 210-11 & n.110; ef Helsmley v.
Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 214, 394 A.2d 65, 72 (1978) ("arms'-length sales of rent controlled
apartment buildings are rare").
141. See generally C. Berger, supra note 105; Berger, supra note 75.
142. Most state courts that have examined the constitutionality of modern rent control conclude
that the Hope doctrine applies. See, eg., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 165, 550
P.2d 1001, 1027, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 491 (1976); Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Coun-
cil, 68 N.J. 543, 568-70, 350 A.2d 1, 15 (1975). A few towns permanently remove apartment units
from rent controls when the unit is first vacated after the controls go into effect. See Baar, supra note
103, at 826 & n.391. The temporary duration of these controls justifies disregarding the Hope stan-
dards for some time. If the tenants are likely to remain for a while, the rate of return required by
Hope may be decreased to reflect the expected temporary duration of the controls.
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to rent control, while the constraints imposed by Hope result in the con-
stitutionality of the barriers. Because the utility ratemaking doctrine is
central to the constitutionality of rent control, it is important to consider
how that doctrine applies to the typical methods used to fix rents.
III. AN APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON UTILITY
RATEMAKING TO RENT CONTROL
The Constitution does not require use of a particular method to fix
prices. Instead, the financial impact of the new prices must satisfy the
standards that Hope established.'43 These standards require that the
constitutionality be determined by "a balancing of the investor and con-
sumer interests."" The investor interest requires that the new prices
generate enough revenue to cover operating and capital costs.'45 To pay
the capital costs, the revenues must pay the interest on the debt and pro-
vide earnings to the equity investors. 146 The earnings to the equity inves-
tors must compensate the investor for the risks of the business and assure
confidence in the financial integrity of the business.' 47 If new prices sat-
isfy the investor interest, the Constitution is satisfied. If, however, the
new prices fail to satisfy the investor interest, the inquiry is not over,
because the countervailing public interest may justify the prices.
Although the meaning of the public interest is not as clear as the investor
interest, the Supreme Court's ratemaking opinions give some definition
to that term. Courts may exclude from the price-setting process those
costs resulting from mismanagement, inefficient operations or imprudent
investments. 48 Deteriorating service justifies lower prices.49 The need
to use effective and efficient procedures can also outweigh the investor
interest. '0 Given these requirements of Hope, the constitutional review
of new prices does not depend on a simple calculation.
Rent control procedures generally roll back all rents to the market
rents on a fixed date prior to the effective date of the rent controls and
143 See Hope, 320 U.S. at 602 ("It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts.").
144. Id. at 603.
145. Id.
146. Even though an individual or partnership owner of an apartment building has no stock
investors, the owner is entitled to a return on its own investment in the building.
147. 320 U.S. at 603.
148. See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 412 (1894). For a discussion
of the meaning of the public interest in the ratemaking cases, see Drobak, supra note 8, at 88-98.
149. See, eg., Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
150. See, eg., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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then provide for annual rent increases applicable to all landlords. 5' The
procedures also permit individual landlords to petition for increases in
their own rents if they can demonstrate that their return is too low. The
more generous the annual adjustments, the less need for individual in-
creases. If, however, a town uses annual adjustments to keep rents as
close as possible to the constitutional minimum, it needs to use proce-
dures that quickly resolve individual petitions.'52 Because the Hope doc-
trine permits any kind of price-setting methodology, any of the methods
for annual adjustments or individual increases may result in constitu-
tional rents. But the result of rent control will most likely be constitu-
tional if the standards used to adjust individual rents correspond with the
Hope requirements.
A. The Constitutionality of the Standards Used in Individual Rent
Adjustment Proceedings
The standards used in individual rent adjustment proceedings fit into
five general classifications. 153 One type, the return-on-value standard, is
very similar to the methodology used in utility ratemaking. The stan-
dard entitles a landlord to rents that cover operating expenses and yield a
return on the fair value of the property.1 54 Value can be defined in differ-
ent ways, including market value, assessed value and reproduction cost.
In Hope, the Supreme Court rejected the notion, which had dominated
utility ratemaking for nearly fifty years, that the Constitution required a
return on either the current market value or the reproduction cost of a
151. See, e.g., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 613-14, 350 A.2d 34, 38-39
(1975). For a survey of the variety of across-the-board increases, see Baar, supra note 103, at 767-81.
152. See, ag., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 169-73, 550 P.2d 1001, 1029-33,
130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 493-97 (1976); Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 242, 394 A.2d 65,
68-69 (1978). Most towns adjust the rent for only a very small percentage of apartments with indi-
vidual proceedings, although some adjust a substantial percentage annually. Baar, supra note 103, at
783-84.
153. See Baar, supra note 103, at 784.
154. See, eg., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 622-23, 350 A.2d 34, 44
(1975); Baar, supra note 103, at 797. Most rent control ordinances evaluate the fairness of rental
income generated by an apartment building or an apartment. See, e.g., Troy Hills Village v. Town-
ship Council, 68 N.J. 604, 627, 350 A.2d 34, 46 (1975); Baar, supra note 103, at 862-65 (quoting
typical ordinances). The Constitution does not require that practice. As long as the landlord's
aggregate rental income from all of its buildings in the jurisdiction satisfy the Hope criteria, the
landlord's financial interests are protected and the Constitution is satisfied. The Hope doctrine is
satisfied even if one building generates rental income below the level that Hope requires as long as
another building makes up the deficiency. See, eg., Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 345 U.S.
146, 148 (1953).
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utility's property.155 The Supreme Courts of California and New Jersey
have recognized that the Constitution does not require rents to include a
return on the value of the property, whichever valuation method is cho-
sen. 156 Likewise, the Constitution does not require any adjustment to
property valuation in order to protect a landlord from an inflationary
loss of purchasing power. 157 The return-on-value standard may result in
155. See generally Bernstein, supra note 63; Siegel, supra note 12.
156. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 680-81, 693 P.2d 261, 290-91, 209 Cal. Rptr.
682, 711-12 (1984), afr'd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986) (appeal involved only antitrust issue); Helmsley v.
Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 215, 394 A.2d 65, 71-72 (1978). See generally Baar, supra note
103, at 797.
157. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d at 680-85, 693 P.2d at 290-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 711-
14 & n.38. The Supreme Court's ratemaking opinions show that the Constitution does not require
adjustments to property valuations as protection against inflation. In the landmark opinion in
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the Supreme Court held that valuation for ratemaking pur-
poses could be based on reproduction cost. As a result of the extended depressions of the 1870s and
1890s, reproduction cost was lower than original construction cost, the standard advocated by the
utilities. See 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 39 (1970); Siegel, supra note 12, at 222-
23. Thus the holding in Smyth denied utility investors any constitutional immunity from the finan-
cial harms of deflation. Schwartz, Inflation and Utility Rate Regulation, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 89, 97.
During the early twentieth century, utilities benefited from valuations at reproduction cost because
inflation made reproduction cost greater than original cost. See, eg., 1 A. KAHN, supra, at 40;
Schwartz, supra, at 97. Later opinions, which interpreted Smyth as requiring valuations based on
reproduction cost, resulted in a "constitutional right to inflation insurance." Schwartz, supra, at 97.
The reproduction cost standard favored investors in many other ways besides inflation protection.
See, eg., 2 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE APPRAISAL OF PROP-
ERTY FOR DIFFERENT LEGAL PURPOSES 1078-1156 (1937); Siegel, supra note 12, at 222, 233-34,
240-43; Schwartz, supra, at 97. When the Supreme Court in Hope freed regulators from any particu-
lar valuation method, it showed that the Constitution does not require a rate base valuation that
protects utility investors from inflation.
By requiring returns sufficient to attract capital, the investor interest standard of Hope furnishes
some indirect protection against inflation because the costs of raising funds in the capital markets
reflect expectations of future inflation. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d at 681-85, 693 P.2d
at 291-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-14; Schwartz, supra, at 98-99, 103. But Hope requires that the
public interest be balanced against the investors' interest, and it would be unfair to poor tenants if
they must help protect the landlord against inflationary losses. Consideration of fairness in allocat-
ing the burdens of inflation
is not easy because price inflation, by its very nature, is unfair and disorderly in its impacts
on different classes of people, and because any attempt to save one particular class against
its inequities runs the risk of imposing even more severe burdens on unprotected classes. It
also runs the risk of adding fuel to the inflationary fire.
J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 273 (1961) (hereinafter cited as J. BON-
BRIGHT PRINCIPLES). Nonetheless, denying landlords protection of the purchasing power of their
investments is not unfair to them. Inflation harms many investors this way, such as bondholders,
preferred stock owners and others with fixed-rate investments. Id. at 124. Landlords, like other
investors, should expect to suffer the financial consequences of the changes in national economic
conditions.
Landlords would not fare any better under state ratemaking precedent because state utility com-
missions and courts do not interpret the Constitution as requiring compensation for the loss of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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constitutional rents, but whether rents are constitutional cannot be
known until the impact on the landlord is determined.15 The second
standard, return-on-equity, incorporates the impact on the landlord.
The return-on-equity standard results in rents that cover operating ex-
penses and mortgage payments and provides a return on the owner's own
cash investment in the property.159 This standard is a direct application
of the investor interest of Hope.16 ° When the return is sufficient to satisfy
the Hope criteria, rents set under the return-on-equity standard are con-
stitutional. 161 This does not mean, however, that a landlord is constitu-
purchasing power. Utility regulators have been concerned with a different aspect of inflation-the
inability of utilities to actually achieve the authorized rate of return as a result of the "regulatory
lag" in processing an application for a rate increase during inflationary times. See generally
Schwartz, supra; Warren, Regulated Industries'Automatic Cost of Service Adjustment Clauses: Do
They Increase or Decrease Cost to the Consumer?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 333 (1980). The Constitu-
tion does not even require that utilities be protected against regulatory lag. See, e.g., Gulf States
Utils. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 364 So. 2d 1266, 1274 (La. 1978). An inflationary increase in two
different kinds of costs causes the inability to earn the authorized rate of return. First, as inflation
causes increased expenses during the time that an authorized set of rates is in effect, investors' earn-
ings are eroded until a new rate schedule is approved. See, eg., New England Tel. Co. v. Depart-
ment Pub. Util., 371 Mass. 67, 73-74, 354 N.E.2d 860, 865 (1976); Warren, supra, at 334, 335-37.
Second, as new plant at inflated construction costs goes into service, investors' returns decrease until
the rates are increased to reflect the added plant. See, eg., New England Tel. Co. v. Department
Pub. Util., 371 Mass. 67, 73-75, 354 N.E.2d 860, 864-65 (1976); 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, supra note 6, at
203-04. This "attrition" in return caused by increased investment and regulatory lag is much less of
a problem in rent control than in utility regulation. Capital investment in existing apartment build-
ings is irregular and miniscule when compared with the on-going extensive construction programs of
most utilities. Consequently, neither the constitutional ratemaking doctrine nor the utility ratemak-
ing principles compel the use of rent control as a way of furnishing landlords inflation insurance.
158. The return-on-value standard has conceptual and practical drawbacks besides failing to
examine directly the financial impact of the rents on the landlords. Because market value depends
on the expected future income from the property, it is circular to use the market value to set rents,
which produce the future income of the property. See, eg., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1929) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Helmsley v. Bor-
ough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 213-14, 394 A.2d 65, 71 (1978). Determining value by hypothesizing
a comparable rental market free of the aberrations that led to the rent control is infeasible. The New
Jersey Supreme Court suggested that methodology in Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68
N.J. 604, 623-24, 350 A.2d 34, 44 (1975). In a later case, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
the impossibility of using a hypothetical rental market and rejected the return-on-value standard as
"practically unworkable." Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 215, 394 A.2d at 72.
159. See, eg Zussman v. Rent Control Bd., 371 Mass. 632, 638, 359 N.E.2d 29, 33 (1976);
Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 216 n.8, 394 A.2d at 72 n.8. See generally Baar, supra note 103, at 790-96.
160. Many courts require that the allowed rate of return meet the Hope criteria. See, e.g., Hut-
ton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 569-70, 350 A.2d at, 15-16 (1975),
161. A few trial courts have questioned the constitutionality of the return-on-equity standard
because it results in different rents for identical apartment buildings if the financing for each building
differs. See Baar, supra note 103, at 793-94 & n.270. The California Supreme Court, however,
recently rejected an equal protection claim based on this kind of disparate result. Fisher v. City of
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tionally entitled to a return on all of its own investment. To account for
inefficient financial practices, utility ratemaking principles permit an
agency to impute an appropriate capital structure in calculating the al-
lowed return if the utility's actual debt-equity ratio is improper.162 Like-
wise, a rent control board may constitutionally apply the return-on-
equity standard using hypothesized appropriate financial data instead of
an owner's actual, but imprudent, investment. 63 In addition, if the
mortgage interest rate is excessive or the purchase price inflated, the
rents need not reflect those improper costs.", Finally, the Constitution
does not require that rents be based on the purchase price of an apart-
ment building if the building is sold after rent control has gone into ef-
fect. Utility ratemaking principles demonstrate that rents may be based
on the investment that is equivalent to the depreciated value of the build-
ing on the date rent control began.
1 65
Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d at 683, 693 P.2d at 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Each landlord's constitutional
rights are satisfied if the landlord's rental income meets the Hope criteria. The reasons for preferring
the return-on-equity standard justifies the different treatment of the landlords as well as of the ten-
ants in each building. Equal protection is not violated.
162. See, e.g., 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 210-15.
163. For example, in Zussman v. Rent Control Board, 371 Mass. 632, 359 N.E.2d 29 (1976), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a rent increase that failed to cover all of the owner's
debt service, in part because the owner financed all of the building's purchase price with a mortgage
loan, a highly unusual practice. Id. at 639-40, 359 N.E.2d at 33-34; see Hutton Park Gardens v.
West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 570, 350 A.2d 1, 16 (1975); Mahoney v. Hoboken Rent
Leveling Bd., 178 N.J. Super. 51, 58-59, 427 A.2d 1138, 1141 (1981); Baar, supra note 103, at 789,
790 n.254, 792 n.263.
164. See, eg., Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. at 570, 350 A.2d at
16.
165. A rent control standard, like the return-on-equity standard that bases rents on the land-
lord's own debt service requirements and investment will allow variable rents depending upon the
purchase price of the property and the market interest rate prevailing when the purchase occurred.
A purchase, which can result in a significant increase in rents, also provides a way for landlords to
exercise some control over the rent regulation process. See Baar, supra note 103, at 788. Some cases
have considered a utility's purchase of the operating properties of another utility. If the purchase
price exceeded the depreciated original cost of the properties, most utility commissions have contin-
ued to value the properties for ratemaking purposes at the depreciated original cost. See, eg.,, Niag-
ara Falls Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 137 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 792-93, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 815 (1943); 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 189.
Utility investors are compensated for the capital they devote to the utility business. The purchasing
utility now provides service to the same customers with the transferred properties, which did not
change in any way with the sale. The properties were a contribution to service valued at depreciated
original cost before the sale, so they retain that value for ratemaking purposes after the sale. See J.
BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES, supra note 157, at 175-78. If the property transfer resulted in a gain in
operating efficiencies, some commissions will recognize the purchase price as the proper valuation
for ratemaking purposes. See id. at 177-78; 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 189-90. No constitu-
tional impediment exists to disregarding the purchaser's investment that exceeds the depreciated
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Besides requiring a return on investment, utility principles also require
a return of investment. Investors, in effect, loan their capital for the use
of the customers. While the loan remains unpaid, investors earn the re-
turn on their outstanding investment. Customers gradually repay the
loan because utility rates include an annual depreciation expense. 166 As
long as the Hope requirements are satisfied, utility investors need not re-
ceive any profits from the sale of utility property. Constitutionally, the
profits may be used to decrease the rates that the customers would other-
wise pay.167 Rent controls cannot feasibly base a reduction in rents on
the profits from the sale of a rent-controlled building because a later rent
reduction does not affect the former owner who received the profits. No
reason exists, however, for allowing a landlord to recover twice the in-
vestment in the property, once from the proceeds of the sale and once
from an annual depreciation expense in the rents.168 If the landlord will
recoup its investment from the sale of the buildings, a depreciation ex-
pense in the rents is not constitutionally required. The return of invest-
ment will come from the sale.
The third and fourth standards used in individual rent-adjustment pro-
cedures depart from the typical utility ratemaking methodology. The
maintenance-of-net-operating-income standard, which may be the most
effective and fair rent control procedure, 169 permits individual adjust-
original cost of the properties. This principle means that rents may constitutionally be based on the
capital that is equivalent to the depreciated original cost of the rental property, with original cost
determined at the current value of the investment when rent control went into effect. Some ordi-
nances disregard any increases in mortgage payments that occur after the adoption of rent control to
approximate the depreciated original cost. See Baar, supra note 103, at 788. In addition, ordinances
that permit rent control boards to disregard excessive purchase prices can also result in valuations
similar to depreciated original cost. See Zussman v. Rent Control Bd., 371 Mass. 632, 359 N.E.2d
29 (1976). Finally, the "maintenance-of-net-operating-income" standard, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 169-72, accomplishes a similar result because it bases rents on the original owner's net
operating income, which in turn was dependent on the original owner's debt service and return.
166. See, eg., 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 112-16.
167. See, e-g., Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 485
F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); cf. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council
on Water Co. Lands, 453 F. Supp. 942, 952-53 (D. Conn. 1977) (dictum), affd mem., 439 U.S. 999
(1978).
168. See, eg., Apartment & Office Bldg. Ass'n v. Washington, 381 A.2d 588, 589 (D.C. 1977);
Troy Hills Village v. Town Council, 68 N.J. at 626, 350 A.2d at 46; Note, Rent Control and Land-
lords' Property Rights: The Reasonable Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 165, 186
n.142 (1980). The rents should not include both depreciation expense and mortgage principal pay-
ments; otherwise the landlord would be compensated twice for the debt investment in the property.
Cf Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 212 n.5, 394 A.2d 65, 70 n.5 (1978).
169. See Baar, supra note 103, at 810-11, 816-17.
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ments when the rental income from a building is less than the base period
rent plus the increase in operating expenses since the base period. 7' The
standard permits a landlord to pass through to the tenants any increase
in operating expenses and results in the landlord earning the same net
operating income that it earned in the base period, which the landlord
can use for debt service and as a return on investment.'71 As long as the
base period net operating income satisfies the Hope requirements, which
generally will be the case because the landlord set the base period rents,
the maintenance-of-net-operating-income standard will result in constitu-
tional rental income. As an added assurance of constitutionality, most
ordinances permit the landlord to obtain an additional increase by dem-
onstrating that the base period net operating income was too low. 172 Be-
cause the standard maintains the original net operating income, a new
owner will have to pay debt service and earn a return from that income.
That may be difficult if financing costs have increased, but the resulting
rents will not be unconstitutional because the new owner should have
considered the expected income when agreeing to the purchase price.
The net-operating-income standard permits a rent increase if the net
operating income from the property decreases below a certain percentage
of the gross rental income. 173 Fulfilling the investor interest of Hope de-
pends on the percentage chosen. Too low of a percentage will result in a
low net operating income that cannot pay debt service and provide a
return. If the percentage is high enough, the rental income will satisfy
the Hope test. As a result, the net operating income standard does not
necessarily produce a constitutional rental income level. 174
170. Baar, supra note 103, at 809. For an explanation and analysis of this standard, see id. at
809-17.
171. Net operating income is total income minus operating expenses. Helmsley v. Borough of
Fort Lee, 78 N.J. at 212 n.5, 394 A.2d at 70 n.5. For determining net operating income, operating
income is generally defined as not including depreciation. See id.; Note, Rethinking Rent Control:
An Analysis of "Fair Return," 12 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 647 n.219 (1981).
172. See Baar, supra note 103, at 814-15. The Massachusetts courts accomplish the same result
by interpreting the requirement of a fair net operating income in the ordinances to require rents that
assure landlords reasonable returns on their investment. See, eg., Niles v. Boston Rent Control
Admin., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139, 374 N.E.2d 296, 300 (1978); cf Palos Verdes Shores Mobile
Estates, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 142 Cal. App. 3d 362, 190 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1983) (upholding the
constitutionality of a fair-net-operating-income adjustment that also required that landlords receive
a just and reasonable return).
173. See generally Baar, supra note 103, at 803-09.
174. Ordinances typically allow rent increases if the net operating income is less than 35 to 50%
of the gross rental income. See Baar, supra note 103, at 804 & n.324; Note, supra note 171, at 647.
The Interstate Commerce Commission used net operating income for years to set trucking rates that
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The final standard, cash flow, does not assure that the rental income
will satisfy the investor interest of Hope because it does not provide any
return on the owner's investment. The cash flow standard assures rental
income that is only sufficient to pay operating expenses and mortgage
payments. 175 The investor interest may still be satisfied, however, be-
cause periodic adjustments for all landlords may keep rents high enough.
If the cash flow measure results in a landlord failing to earn any return
on investment, except for payment of debt service, the result will be un-
constitutional-unless the public interest part of the Hope balance justi-
fies the low return.
The need for an effective and efficient method of regulation is not a
public interest sufficient to justify the constitutionality of rents that fail to
meet the investor interest. The Supreme Court cases upholding group
regulation consistently rely on the ability to obtain individual relief.1 76
Even the standard in Permian Basin, which provided the barest relief,
gave more protection to the natural gas producers than that afforded
landlords under a cash flow criterion. 77 The use of the other types of
individual procedures, more protective of landlords, shows that the cash
flow standard is not essential to making rent control work.17 1 Other as-
pects of the public interest, such as mismanagement, will justify the fail-
ure to satisfy the investor interest in particular cases. 179 Sometimes even
the social goal of subsidizing poor tenants will justify what would other-
wise be unconstitutionally low rents.18 0 In most instances, however, the
public interest will not outweigh the investor component of the Hope
balance. The chosen method of rent control must then result in rents
meet the constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Middle West Gen. Increases, 48 M.C.C. 541 (I.C.C.
1948).
175. See generally Baar, supra note 103, at 786-89. A variation of this standard, which allows
additional rental income to provide some return on the owner's investment, will result in income
that satisfies the investor interest if the return is sufficient.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
177. The relief in Permian Basin offered abandonment as an option, which is available in rent
control only through sale of the property. The relief applied to individual wells, so a producer could
earn profits from other wells and still obtain relief from unprofitable ones. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 67-70. The cash flow standard examines the rental income from the entire building, not
individual apartments.
178. Cf Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 173, 550 P.2d 1001, 1032-33, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 496-97 (1976) (delays inherent in unit-by-unit hearings were not essential to accomplish
purposes of rent control).
179. See supra notes 148 & 149 and accompanying text.
180. See Drobak, supra note 8, at 88-98.
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that meet the investor interest. The cash flow standard, therefore, is the
least likely method to satisfy the Hope standard.
B. The Constitutionality of Tenant Subsidies
A few municipalities have tried to assist poor tenants by either
preventing or limiting increases in their rent. These attempts to assist the
poor have not fared well in New Jersey and California, which have re-
cently considered the issue.181 For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Property Owners Association v. Township of North Bergen "2
held unconstitutional a rent control ordinance that prevented rent in-
creases for poor, elderly tenants. The landlord's increased costs were to
be paid first by rent increases for the other tenants and second by a small
subsidy from the township.183 The ordinance contained a fifteen percent
annual limit on rent increases for the other tenants. The North Bergen
court reasoned that the sum of the maximum rent increase from all the
nonprotected tenants plus the town's subsidy could be less than the rent
otherwise required to satisfy the investor interest standard of Hope.
Thus, the court held that the ordinance violated the takings clause.184
Logically, the abstract conclusion about the potential failure to meet
the investor interest is correct, but it does not justify the holding of un-
constitutionality. The Hope doctrine requires an examination of the ex-
pected financial consequences of a price-setting decision. In order to
assess the financial impact on a landlord, a court must examine the actual
rental income to be derived under the ordinance. Given the amount of
the expected increase in annual costs and the number of subsidized ten-
ants in a particular building, a landlord could possibly earn all that the
investor interest requires. This result would mean that the ordinance is
constitutional as applied to that particular landlord. On the other hand,
a landlord may earn some positive profit, yet fail to meet the investor
interest standard. In this situation, a court must determine the expected
deficiency in rental income in order to assess the extent of the financial
harm imposed on the landlord.'85 Just as the regulatory takings cases
181. Property Owners Ass'n. v. Township of North Bergen, 74 N.J. 327, 378 A.2d 25 (1977);
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 201 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Ct. App. 1984) (relying on
Township of North Bergen).
182. 74 N.J. at 327, 378 A.2d at 25.
183. Id. at 331-33, 378 A.2d at 27.
184. Id. at 336-37, 378 A.2d at 30.
185. In the same manner, the expected duration of the financial harm imposed on the landlord is
relevant to the constitutionality. See Parrino v. Lindsay, 29 N.Y.2d 30, 323 N.Y.S.2d 689, 272
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permit government regulation to impose significant financial harm to fur-
ther an important governmental objective,1 16 the Hope doctrine permits
the public's interest to outweigh the investors'.' 87
The purpose of the North Bergen ordinance was to help provide af-
fordable housing for the elderly poor, which is a valid-and important-
governmental objective. If landlords fail to obtain all the rental income
that the investor interest standard would otherwise provide, North Ber-
gen's objective is accomplished partially by a wealth transfer from land-
lords to poor, elderly tenants. Many regulatory takings opinions have
upheld the constitutionality of government actions that resulted in
wealth transfers.1 88 These actions had some other governmental objec-
tive instead of wealth transfer; the transfer was an incidental conse-
quence of furthering that other objective. The constitutionality of the
North Bergen ordinance, however, is a more complex problem because
the wealth transfer from landlords to tenants is not just an incidental
consequence of providing affordable housing to the elderly poor. The
wealth transfer is the chosen means. Nonetheless, the ordinance may
still be constitutional.
The ordinance was tailored to limit the wealth transfers to progressive
N.E.2d 67 (1971) (upholding an ordinance that froze the rents of poor elderly tenants for 17
months); cf Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. at 566-67, 350 A.2d at 13
(suggesting that temporary emergencies justify returns otherwise unfair for a limited time).
186. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Michelman, supra note 13, at 1198-99; Oakes, supra note 16, at 605; Drobak, supra note 8, at 99-103.
One of the purposes of the takings doctrine is to assure a fair sharing of public burdens. See, e.g.,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S.
at 123; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The
Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego 57 IND. L.J. 45, 64 (1982). Although the class of
landlords subject to rent control is smaller than the class of people subject to other kinds of eco-
nomic regulations, such as the class subject to nationwide price controls, the class of landlords is
large enough to conclude that rent control broadly distributes the burdens of rent control.
187. See Drobak, supra note 8, at 88-98; cf Zussman v. Rent Control Bd., 371 Mass. at 640, 359
N.E.2d at 34 (using goal of providing affordable housing to families of low and moderate income as a
reason for disallowing above average rents); Niles v. Boston Rent Control Adm'r, 6 Mass. App. 135,
146-48, 374 N.E.2d 296, 303 (1948) (interpreting Constitution as prohibiting rents so low that they
cause landlords to incur losses); Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. at
566-67, 350 A.2d at 13 (suggesting that temporary emergencies justify a period of returns otherwise
unfair); Apartment & Office Bldg. Ass'n v. Washington, 381 A.2d 588, 592 (D.C. 1977) (upholding
rent control ordinance that provided individual relief only if return on investment was less than 8%,
a rate of return below mortgage interest rates); Judson, supra note 108 at 222-27 (arguing that invest-
ment interests should be protected less than occupancy interests).
188. See Drobak, supra note 8, at 109.
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ones-from landlords to poorer tenants.1 89 Progressive wealth transfers
have more validity as a proper governmental objective than regressive
transfers or transfers between people of comparable wealth. Further-
more, the constitutionality of the ordinance depends upon the size of the
wealth transfer. Under the principles of the regulatory takings cases and
the Hope doctrine, the constitutionality of a North Bergen-type rent con-
trol subsidy should depend upon a weighing of the actual financial harm
imposed on landlords with the public purposes of the ordinance. If the
financial consequences to the landlords in North Berger are slight, the
ordinance will be constitutional. Thus, the constitutionality cannot be
resolved until the court determines the expected financial effects on
landlords. ' 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinions upholding the constitutionality of na-
tionwide price controls and the opinions establishing the modern limits
on utility ratemaking together define the constitutional constraints on all
forms of price regulation. The first group of opinions explain when a
price regulation program constitutes a taking. The standards of the sec-
ond set of opinions assume that the regulated prices provide the just com-
pensation needed to make the program constitutional. The price control
cases show that the governmental justification for price regulation and
the duration of the regulation affect whether the ratemaking principles
must apply, just as the justification and duration of other kinds of eco-
nomic regulation affect whether compensation is required under the tak-
189. The North Bergen ordinance protected tenants aged 65 years or older whose income did
not exceed $5,000. Income was defined to exclude gifts, inheritance, social security and government
pensions. 74 N.J. at 331-33, 378 A.2d at 27.
190. The court in North Bergen also believed that the cross-subsidization of the poor, elderly
tenants by other tenants "might" be unconstitutional. 74 N.J. at 336-38; 378 A.2d at 30. The court,
however, was also mistaken on this issue. Cross-subsidization of one customer class by another, a
common feature of utility regulation, is constitutional. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES,
supra note 157, at 369-85; 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 285-345. The cross-subsi-
dization aspect of the North Bergen ordinance should easily satisfy the rational relationship test of
both economic substantive due process and economic equal protection. The purpose of the ordi-
nance is to help supply affordable apartments for the elderly poor. Having other tenants contribute
to that goal is no less rational than natural gas customers cross-subsidizing poor gas customers to
help them afford gas heat. Two reasons support the ordinance's conformity with the takings clause.
First, the 15% cap on annual rent increases minimized the financial losses of the subsidizing tenants.
Second, subsidizing tenants are free to move, to other apartment buildings in which their subsidiza-
tion would be less or to other towns or to single-family residences in which there would be no
subsidy.
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ings clause. The unique economic demands of waging World War II
justified price controls that did not comply with the Hope requirements.
During the 1970s, the short duration of the price controls furnished an-
other justification. Although less important to the nationwide price con-
trol decisions, the ability to withdraw from the controlled business is the
primary factor today that permits state and local governments to control
prices without the constraints that limit utility ratemaking.
Legal prohibitions on exit from the utility business implicate the Hope
doctrine; actual exit barriers from other businesses should do the same.
If a firm cannot withdraw from the price-controlled business without in-
ordinate financial loss, as would be the case for a firm with large invest-
ments in specialized assets, that firm faces the likelihood of large losses
from unconstrained price control, even though the law does not compel
the firm to remain in the business. Protection of the firm with the consti-
tutional ratemaking doctrine does not necessarily make state and local
price regulation inefficient or ineffective. The balance of the public and
investor interests in the Hope doctrine gives governments considerable
leeway in their attempts to fashion effective regulation. A government
may strike the balance for the public interest, causing some financial
harm to the investors, or, as some of the rent control standards show, for
the investor interest. Whatever the balance, the outcome should be
reached in the interests of beneficial social policy.
This Article has focused on the constitutional bounds of price regula-
tion, not on the social utility of different types of regulation. The Consti-
tution fixes the lower limit on controlled prices. It does not, however,
define socially beneficial price regulation. The important issues facing
legislators and regulators concern the decision to regulate and the choice
of the means. Understanding the determinants of the constitutional lim-
its on price regulation shows the variety of regulatory means permissible
under the Constitution.
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